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This study has two parts. Part One consists of the report and recommendations of 
the members of the Commission and the Center for American Progress. Part Two is 
a series of working papers prepared by leading civil rights and public interest experts. 
Several of these authors contributed to earlier works of the Commission. While 
the Commission sought out and publishes these papers in order to advance public 
knowledge and understanding of a broad cross-section of civil rights issues, the views 
expressed in each paper represent those of the author/s and not necessarily of the 
Commission, the Center for American Progress, or any of their individual members.
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The erosion of civil rights across our nation over the past 
six years is the result of willful neglect and calculated de-
sign. The Bush administration continues to use the courts 
and the judicial appointment process to narrow civil rights 
protections and repeal remedies for legal redress while 
allowing the traditional tools of the executive branch for 
civil rights enforcement to wither and die. The resulting 
inequality of opportunity, deteriorating civil liberties, and 
rising religious and racial discrimination are sad commen-
taries on the priorities of the current administration.
This new report by the Citizens’ Commission on Civil 
Rights and the Center For American Progress catalogues 
why this is happening and how Congress can take action to 
remedy the situation. The 10 essays in this report encapsu-
late the administration’s failure to enforce civil rights, pro-
tect civil liberties and confront long-standing and emerging 
threats to our nation’s shining virtue: equality of opportu-
nity. The authors of the report, many of them veterans of 
civil rights enforcement and advocacy, detail the methods 
employed by the administration to carry out these serious 
civil rights policy reversals and offer concrete solutions to 
slow the deterioration of our nation’s civil rights and restore 
our promise as the land of equal opportunity.
The first section of the report, written by five former se-
nior officials in the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights 
Division, reveals exactly how civil rights enforcement by 
the executive branch has fallen in to a dangerous state 
of disrepair—on the eve of the division’s historic 50-year 
anniversary. Joseph Rich, 38-year veteran of the division 
until his retirement in 2005, exposes the attacks upon 
the professionalism of the division by political appoin-
tees amid pointed lack of oversight by Congress into 
these transgressions. 
Seth Rosenthal, a 10-year veteran of the division, then ex-
amines the shift in emphasis away from classic civil rights 
enforcement toward action against “human trafficking,” a 
laudable goal, but one previously tackled by other divi-
sions within the Justice Department.
Richard Ugelow, who retired from the Civil Rights Divi-
sion four years ago, explains how civil rights action against 
discrimination in employment practices in the private 
sector and in local and state governments focuses today 
on “reverse discrimination” rather than clear patterns and 
practices of discrimination against African Americans and 
other racial minorities. Similarly, Joseph Rich and two of 
his former Civil Rights Division colleagues, Robert Ken-
gle and Mark Posner, examine how the Bush administra-
tion has allowed “partisan political concerns to influence 
its decision-making” on enforcement of the Voting Rights 
Act, which cuts to the core of our democratic principles 
and is so critical to equality in our country.
To correct these miscarriages of civil rights enforcement, 
the report recommends that Congress establish a Select 
Committee of the House and Senate for civil rights. The 
new Select Committee would: 
• Review the implementation of federal civil rights laws. 
• Conduct oversight hearings and investigations into the 
enforcement of civil rights laws. 
• Implement any needed changes to ensure better civil 
rights enforcement.
In addition, the report calls for Congress to enact a key 
change to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002: enable people 
to bring civil suits in federal courts to redress violations 
of their civil rights. Only then can citizens count on 
the Justice Department and the courts to act to protect 
civil rights.
Fixing what ails the Civil Rights Division is an impor-
tant step that must be taken, but disarray and desuetude 
at the Department of Justice is not the only reason the 
administration has failed to protect our civil rights.  
Elliott Mincberg and Judith Schaeffer, the former legal 
director and associate legal director for the People for 
the American Way, and Adam Shah at Media Matters 
for America, examine the administration’s success at 
appointing conservative “activist” judges to the Supreme 
Court and lower courts—with the express aim of legislat-
ing conservative dogma from the bench.
exeCuTive  suMMary
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The remedy? The president and the Senate must ensure 
that all judicial nominees to the federal bench have a dem-
onstrated commitment to equal justice under law. With-
out judges fully committed to civil rights and liberties our 
nation risks losing its distinctive character as a country 
that offers opportunity to all and protects all against the 
excesses of the powerful.
These same characteristics of the American way of life 
are in jeopardy in other legal arenas. Shaheena Ahmad 
Simons, formerly of the Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund says the struggle for immigration 
reform in our country is complicated by the gap between 
those conservatives who want draconian enforcement of 
U.S. deportation laws and those who want cheap immi-
grant labor. The upshot, says Simons, has been no reform 
at all. The goal of reform should be a positive one: the 
enactment of a defined path to citizenship for millions of 
undocumented immigrants in our society.
Simon’s colleague at the Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, regional counsel Peter Zamora, tack-
les the shortcomings of states, local agencies and the feder-
al government in implementing the guarantees of the No 
Child Left Behind Act that English language learners will 
be fully included in educational opportunities. By 2025, 
Zamora notes, 25 percent of the U.S. school population 
will be English language learners. The Bush administra-
tion and Congress must act now to fully enforce NCLB 
provisions to ensure our schools provide these students 
with the best opportunities to learn.
In communications policy, too, the administration’s lack of 
civil rights enforcement and failure to offer equal opportu-
nity access to new communications technologies leaves mi-
norities under-represented in the communications industry 
and ill-served by its services. Mark Lloyd, a Senior Fellow 
at the Center for American Progress and expert on com-
munications policies, notes that executive branch regulatory 
agencies have stymied past progress on affirmative employ-
ment and minority ownership in communications indus-
tries. Lloyd also examines how policymakers are not seeking 
to bridge the so called “digital divide” by offering Internet 
and computer access to all Americans. 
His solutions are forthright: The Federal Communica-
tions Commission must enact race-conscious measures 
to advance equal employment opportunity and increase 
minority ownership in the communications industry. And 
the government must support the widespread provision 
of communications access points all across the country: in 
rural areas and the inner city, on Indian land and in hospi-
tals, libraries and schools in every community.
Equal opportunity in housing, which is examined in the 
last chapter of our report, is perhaps the most important 
civil rights arena in that it determines access to educa-
tion, jobs, and other crucial services. Yet, it poses the most 
formidable barriers to equality. Philip Tegeler, Executive 
Director of the Poverty and Race Research Action Council, 
explains why equal opportunity housing programs at the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the 
Department of the Treasury are not helping families move 
from higher-poverty segregated neighborhoods to less 
segregated areas.
Tegeler notes that all the legal and policy provisions to 
make these programs effective reside in the hands of ex-
ecutive branch officials at these two agencies. They must 
only be employed to help low-income families enjoy the 
housing mobility that middle- and higher-income fami-
lies take for granted in America. He recommends that 
Public Housing Authorities cooperate across jurisdic-
tions and embrace new housing mobility programs, and 
that the Treasury department and the Internal Revenue 
Service actively support fair housing programs and use 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program to encour-
age housing mobility.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in many ways distracted the 
nation from determination to improve and enforce exist-
ing civil rights laws. In this new environment the Bush ad-
ministration has taken regressive steps that undermine our 
civil liberties, our civil rights and our expectations of equal 
opportunity. The detailed analysis that follows—alongside 
the specific recommendations to cope with the erosion of 
our civil rights over the past six years—provides Congress 
and the American people with a roadmap to help us 
reclaim the promise of equal opportunity for all.
 
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When the Citizens’ Commission published the most recent of its series of reports on the record of the in-
cumbent administration in carrying out the laws protect-
ing civil rights, the nation was still reeling from the shock 
and tragedy of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
In the years since, much of the concern of those who play a 
role in our legal system has been focused on striking a bal-
ance between ensuring the physical security of the nation’s 
people and preserving the personal liberties written into our 
Constitution and laws. Issues arising from the detention 
of people without charges against them for long periods 
of time, warrantless wiretaps and searches, and heightened 
security measures in many aspects of daily life have come to 
the fore and may still lack clear legal resolution.
Separate from these issues are others relating to the core 
principle of equality of opportunity. While separate, issues 
of equality that have been the Commission’s continuing 
concern in this series are linked in several ways to the 
pervasive shadow of terrorism. In the first place, huge 
amounts of dollars that might otherwise have been spent 
on investing in opportunities for disadvantaged people 
have been channeled to the costs of war and security. Sec-
ond, much of the burden of distrust in the current atmo-
sphere falls on those who are “different” in skin color, in 
religion or in other ways. In an era of constraints, freedom 
and opportunity do not flourish for those who have been 
discriminated against and deprived.
Third, actions taken by the current administration and 
the courts to narrow civil rights protections and repeal 
remedies have escaped the public notice that they might 
otherwise receive in a time when people are less preoccu-
pied with war and physical danger.
This report represents an effort to bring some of the major 
aspects of the erosion of civil rights to public attention and to 
spur action by Congress and others who have a responsibil-
ity to monitor the performance of the executive branch. In 
many ways the centerpiece of the report is in the four essays 
that make up the chapter on the Justice Department’s Civil 
Rights Division, essays that document a systematic effort 
by the Bush administration to dismantle the government 
machinery for effectuating civil rights. The Division has 
served as the fulcrum for government’s civil rights efforts ever 
since it was created from a much smaller Section as part of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and particularly since Congress 
gave comprehensive substantive content to equal rights in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
dEpartmEnt of JuSticE: 
civil rightS diviSion
In the years following, the Civil Rights Division earned 
historical credit for helping to transform the nation from 
an almost exclusively white male society to one in which 
African Americans and other persons of color and women 
are active participants in the political and legal systems 
and in which people formerly excluded now have oppor-
tunities for education and productive employment.
But paradoxically, as the Division approaches its 50th 
anniversary, it has fallen on bad days. The current admin-
istration has treated the Division as a vessel for its own 
political objectives, often disregarding the law and sullying 
the group’s reputation for professionalism and integrity.
This is not to say that the Division has not encountered 
hard times before. During the late 1960s and early 70s the 
Justice Department (along with the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare) became the vehicle for President 
Nixon’s effort to delay and curb school desegregation 
remedies in order to transform the South into Republi-
can political territory. The Nixon administration’s effort, 
although ultimately not successful in the courts, stalled 
progress and embittered the debate over civil rights.
Again, in the 80s, the incumbent administration installed 
leaders in the Justice Department and its Civil Rights 
Division who were committed to thwarting federal laws 
and court decisions that conflicted with its own political 
agenda. William Bradford Reynolds, who headed the Di-
vision under President Ronald Reagan, simply announced 
that he would not bring cases to implement the Supreme 
Court’s decisions calling for the desegregation of Northern 
public schools. He twisted and limited voting remedies, 
refused to seek remedies for employment and housing 
practices that harmed minorities and were not dictated 
by business necessity and abandoned the Justice Depart-
ment’s previous position that universities that practiced 
racial discrimination should not receive tax exemptions.
Even in better times, the Justice Department and its Civil 
Rights Division have been subject to criticism. Entrusted by 
presidents from Lyndon Johnson on with coordinating the 
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policies of the entire federal government on civil rights, the 
Department and the Division have often taken the narrow 
view that court litigation is the only useful remedy and have 
neglected other legal avenues for progress.
But arguably, the Civil Rights Division has never fallen 
lower than it has over the past six years. As Joe Rich points 
out in his essay on the attack on professionalism in the 
Division, the current political leaders of the Division in 
many instances have not only rejected the advice of the 
professional civil rights lawyers, but have failed even to 
consult them. While protests and resignations of attorneys 
occurred in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, morale 
has been driven to a new low in the current administra-
tion. In previous administrations, Congress has exercised an 
oversight role over the work of the Division, but until 2007, 
with Republicans in control of both houses of Congress and 
with fewer sympathetic legislators, there has been almost no 
effective challenge to the Division’s many failures.
Seth Rosenthal, like all the other contributors to this section 
an alumnus of the Division, brings to light another tech-
nique used by political appointees to shortchange important 
civil rights programs. The Criminal Civil Rights Section 
of the Division has focused increasing attention on crimes 
of “human trafficking,” usually involving foreign nationals 
brought to the United States. While this is clearly an im-
portant area of law enforcement, until recently some of the 
prosecutions had been handled by other units of the Justice 
Department. The shift has meant that fewer resources are 
devoted to cases involving hate crimes or misconduct by 
state or local law enforcement officials—categories of of-
fenses that many of the division’s lawyers have regarded as 
the core mission of the Criminal Section.
Richard Ugelow, a veteran fair employment lawyer, writes of 
the decline of cases initiated by the Employment Section to 
deal with “patterns or practices” of discrimination and also of 
cases involving discrimination by state or local governments. 
Much of the decline is in cases where the complainants are 
African American while devoting more resources to “reverse 
discrimination” cases where the complainants are white.
Joe Rich and colleagues Bob Kengle and Mark Posner also 
write about the critical area of voting. Here the Justice 
Department has special responsibilities under Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act to approve or disapprove proposed 
electoral changes by states and localities. Because of the 
political sensitivity of such reviews, the Department has 
adopted procedures to ensure the integrity of the process. 
But the Bush administration has cast these protections 
aside in cases arising in Mississippi, Texas and Georgia.
The result, the authors say, is that “the Bush administra-
tion has abused the authority entrusted in the Justice 
Department to fairly and vigorously enforce Section 5…
by allowing partisan political concerns to influence its 
decision-making. This has damaged the Section 5 process, 
undermined the credibility of the Justice Department and 
the Civil Rights Division and resulted in discriminatory 
voting changes being precleared.”
These essays, carefully documented, cover only a part 
of the work of the Justice Department. The Education 
Section, for example, is entrusted with enforcing the 
central constitutional principle of equal educational op-
portunity established in Brown v. Board of Education. In 
the last administration, the Section initiated discussions 
of voluntary efforts to preserve school desegregation in 
districts where litigation had not been filed or court de-
crees had expired. A brief was filed by the Department 
in one case defending the voluntary desegregation policy 
against an attack lauded by a white parent displeased 
with his child’s assignment. In the current administra-
tion, the Bush administration took the issue out of the 
hands of the Civil Rights Division and the Solicitor 
General filed a brief in the Supreme Court arguing that 
race-conscious desegregation policies violate the Consti-
tution. The result the Department argued for could tear 
a gaping hole in the Brown decision and educational 
opportunities for children.
The Commission intends to follow up this report with 
studies of the performance of the Division in education 
and other areas not covered here.
rEShaping thE courtS
As Elliot Mincberg and Judith Schaefer document, the 
Bush administration has seized upon the advent of two 
vacancies on the Supreme Court to turn the Court in a 
decidedly conservative direction. With the confirmation 
of John Roberts to succeed William Rehnquist as Chief 
Justice and Samuel Alito to replace Sandra Day O’Connor 
as an Associate Justice, the precariously balanced Court 
has taken a clear turn to the right.
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While it is still early in the new regime, there are strong 
signs that established principles in the areas of school 
desegregation and reproductive freedom are in peril along 
with protections in other areas of personal liberties. In 
many cases Justice Anthony Kennedy will succeed Justice 
O’Connor as the swing vote on the Court and he has 
demonstrated a decidedly more conservative bent.
As Adam Shah details in his review of lower court nomi-
nations, the story of nominations to courts of appeals 
(and district courts as well) has been much the same.  
The Bush administration has been relentless in its efforts 
to pack the lower courts with conservative ideologues. 
Democratic Senators, in the minority until this year and 
faced with near unanimity by Republicans, were reduced 
to threatening a filibuster of the nominees they regarded 
as most threatening to rights and liberties. But they could 
not sustain their opposition to many nominees whose 
views they found repugnant. As a result, Democrats 
struck a deal with the Republicans that allowed a sig-
nificant number of nominees to be approved without a 
filibuster. Senate approval of these nominations has given 
a conservative (even a right wing) cast to several of the 
Circuit Courts of Appeal.
The question is not one of judicial restraint versus judicial 
activism. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court in recent years has 
exceeded the activism of its predecessors by showing a 
willingness to overturn acts of Congress designed to ben-
efit poor or minority citizens. Nor are the Bush nominees 
to the Court people who fit the mold of thoughtful con-
servatives such as John Marshall Harlan, Felix Frankfuter 
or Lewis Powell. 
Rather they are people who reject the Supreme Court’s 
principle that searching judicial inquiry must be applied 
whenever these “discrete and insular minorities” suffer 
prejudice for which there is no available remedy in the 
political process.1 If a willingness to protect the rights of 
the powerless were a requirement for judicial service, few, 
if any, of the Bush nominees would qualify. 
thE StrugglE for  
immigration rEform
In the battle over immigration policy, the Bush administra-
tion has sought to thread its way between the draconian 
arguments of some conservatives that people not in the 
nation lawfully should be treated harshly and deported and 
the arguments of progressive groups that new laws should 
provide worker protections and a pathway to citizenship for 
people who reside in the U.S. but lack legal status.
As Shaheena Ahmad Simons recounts, the administra-
tion has advocated a “get tough” border security initiative 
and increased enforcement of immigrations laws at work 
sites while at the same time raising hopes that it would 
embrace measures that would reunites families and help 
people obtain legal status.
Although local attacks on day laborers have grown, the 
November elections suggested that positive treatment of im-
migrants might also be good politics for both parties. One 
thing seems certain: a failure by the administration and 
Congress to find a constructive solution would be a recipe 
for escalating interethnic conflict in the years to come.
policiES to hElp EngliSh  
languagE lEarnErS
When Congress established in the No Child Left Behind 
Act the goal of closing the academic gap between well off 
children and those who are disadvantaged and discrimi-
nated against, one of the biggest challenges was to secure 
academic progress for English language learners (ELLs).
A great deal rides on meeting this challenge. While most 
of the 5.2 million English language learners are native 
born American, the population is increasing rapidly and 
experts predict that by 2025, one-quarter of the total U.S. 
school population will be ELLs. Three-quarters of current 
ELLs are Spanish speaking and two-thirds come from low-
income families.
As Peter Zamora reports, the record of states, local 
agencies and the Federal government is at best mixed. 
Most states have not taken the steps needed to cre-
ate assessments that yield valid and reliable results for 
ELLs. Although the NCLB contemplates the develop-
ment of native language assessments as a measure to 
reflect what students know and can do while they are 
learning English, the Department of Education has not 
moved to develop such assessments or ensure that they 
are widely used. Nor has the Department vigorously 
enforced the provisions of NCLB designed to ensure 
good assessments.
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communicationS policy 
and civil rightS
As Mark Lloyd observes, “communication policy deter-
mines who gets to speak to whom, how soon and at what 
cost.” The stakes are high in an era of advanced informa-
tion technology. Those who lack access may have their 
economic prospects stunted, their status as participants in 
society diminished. 
The essay reviews a three-decade long effort in federal policy 
to introduce affirmative employment policies to the broad-
cast industry. While the effort met with some success in the 
90s, it has since been stymied by regressive Supreme Court 
decisions and crabbed interpretations of the law by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. Efforts to increase the 
numbers of minority owners have met similar obstacles. 
At the same time, the Internet has been increasing rapidly 
in importance as an instrument of commerce and commu-
nication. Some initiatives by Congress have sought to ad-
dress the “digital divide” between “haves” and “have-nots” 
in access to computers and the Internet. Some initiatives 
by Congress and federal agencies have produced progress; 
these include a program to support telecommunications 
services in remote and rural areas and other places where 
costs are high; the E-Rate program to provide classrooms 
and libraries informational services through the Internet; 
and healthcare services to patients in rural areas. But the 
E-Rate and other programs have had to struggle against 
members of Congress suspicious of its purposes.
Large disparities exist for Latinos, Black and Native 
Americans, and people with disabilities in their access to 
computers. The struggle for equality in these and related 
areas is likely to persist for years.
fEdEral houSing policy:  
fundamEntal nEEdS and 
untappEd potEntial
While civil rights advocates fight battle after battle to re-
tain the protections of laws being administered and adju-
dicated by hostile guardians, some of the most important 
barriers to equality remain largely unattended.
If people of color who are poor had a route to find decent, 
affordable housing and the ability to choose locations, 
they would have access to educational opportunities, ser-
vices and jobs that would allow them to work themselves 
out of poverty. The federal government, having dug the 
policy hole that has left the minority poor in concentrated 
poverty, certainly has a responsibility to help them.
As Philip Tegeler points out, the government does in 
fact maintain programs that could provide the assistance 
needed. “Virtually alone among federal housing programs,” 
he writes, “the Section 8 program has provided an op-
tion to families who choose to move from higher-poverty 
segregated neighborhoods to less segregated areas.” But a 
variety of obstacles, including jurisdictional barriers when 
families in one area could be matched with housing op-
portunities in another, prevent the voucher program from 
being effective in achieving this goal. Since, as Tegeler 
states, the major constituency is the housing industry, 
mobility for families does not rank high.
Similarly, the Federal Low Income Housing Tax Code pro-
gram is the nation’s largest low-income housing productions 
program and could serve to provide units for families in 
areas of opportunity. But here too, the agency charged with 
implementing the law—the Department of Treasury—has 
virtually ignored the mandate of the Fair Housing Act that 
all federal agencies take steps to further fair housing. So 
the Department omits entirely from its regulations the all 
important subject of site selection. Often the statute works 
to provide housing in a way that concentrates poverty and 
racial isolation, directly contrary to national policy. 
New national policies designed to provide opportunities 
for those who are worst off in society must focus on ways 
in which government policies distort the market and block 
access to the development of affordable housing in racially 
and economically integrated areas. 
rEcommEndationS
To restore the foundation of our civil rights laws and 
strengthen their enforcement, the Citizens’ Commission 
and the Center for American Progress offer the following 
recommendations:
CiviL righTs MoniToring by Congress
We recommend that Congress establish a Select Committee 
of the House and Senate to conduct a two year review of 
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the implementation of federal civil rights laws. The com-
mittee should be composed of senior members of both 
parties who serve on the Judiciary committees and on the 
other committees of each house that deal with education, 
employment, housing and the administration of justice.
The Select Committee should have subpoena power and 
should conduct public hearings on the performance of each 
departmental agency that has significant responsibilities for 
administering civil rights laws. The Select Committee should 
publish one or more reports containing specific recommenda-
tions or directives for the restoration of vigorous civil rights 
enforcement. The Select Committee should also recommend to 
the Congress any needed changes in statutes designed to make 
enforcement more effective.
At the same time, the Committees of Congress that vote on 
nominations for executive officers should conduct scrupulous 
reviews of all nominations to ensure that the nominees are 
committed to the implementation of the civil rights laws.
As the four essays reviewing the Civil Rights Division of the 
Department of Justice reveal, enforcement of the nation’s 
civil rights laws has fallen into a dangerous state of disrepair. 
The situation cannot be remedied by half measures, but 
requires reconstruction of the agencies with a new commit-
ment to fidelity to law by cabinet-level officers, new policy 
and a regulatory process that seeks full realization of the 
rights specified in the statute, and civil rights officials and 
reliance on the professional judgment of experienced lawyers.
sTaTuTory reMeDies To effeCTuaTe 
CiviL righTs
We recommend that Congress ensure that every statute 
protecting civil rights specifically authorize aggrieved 
persons to bring civil suits in the federal courts to redress 
violations of the law. The most important statutes requir-
ing the specification of a private right of action are Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2002.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 called upon federal agencies to 
prevent racial discrimination in programs or activities assisted 
by federal funds. While the law has been an effective tool 
for striking down discrimination in schools, health facilities, 
housing, public transportation and other areas, the Supreme 
Court, in the Sandoval case, ruled that individuals have no 
right to sue to enforce regulations that bar practices that have 
a disparate impact on minorities and that are not dictated 
by necessity. While in the past some aggrieved parents have 
successfully brought suit for violations of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (the underlying law of NCLB) in 
recent years the Supreme Court has been reluctant to imply a 
right of action that is not explicitly set forth in the statute.
Strong government enforcement of civil rights laws is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for vindicating 
the civil rights of persons whom the law is designed to 
protect. The courts must be available to those who are 
discriminated against in violation of the laws. Congress 
may wish to establish administrative remedies that may 
be the first resort for people seeking redress. But any 
such administrative process should be speedy and ef-
ficient and should ensure that there will be rapid access 
to the courts.
seCure JuDges CoMMiTTeD  
To equaL JusTiCe
President Bush should not nominate persons to the federal 
bench and the Senate should not confirm nominees unless 
the person under consideration has a demonstrated com-
mitment to equal justice under law.
Over the past six years, the president has nominated to 
the federal courts many people who have lacked a com-
mitment to equal justice and in some cases have demon-
strated active hostility to civil rights. The Senate has not 
in most instances conducted a thorough review of the 
records of these nominees. Democrats, lacking a major-
ity until this year, have not had the unanimity needed to 
reject most nominations. Republicans have followed the 
party line. Even the few who in the past have demon-
strated independence have apparently shrunk from op-
posing administration candidates for fear of losing their 
influence in the party.
As a result, several of the federal circuit courts of appeals 
have become places notably unfriendly to the assertion of 
civil rights and liberties and to claims for environmental 
and consumer protection. The Supreme Court, far from 
exercising judicial restraint, has attacked precedents dating 
back more than half a century in order to deprive Congress 
of the authority to use the Commerce Clause and Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect equality of op-
portunity and the general welfare. 
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Unless our leaders take steps now to reverse this trend, we are 
in real danger of losing our distinctive character as a nation 
that offers opportunity to all and protects all against the 
excesses of the powerful.
In addition, the report includes the following recommen-
dation from our contributing authors: 
immigration
The administration and Congress should define a meaningful 
and comprehensive fix for the immigration system including 
a defined path to citizenship for millions of undocumented 
immigrants living and working in the United States and 
steadfast vigilance against counterproductive “get tough” 
enforcement at the federal, state and local levels.
Educating English language learners
The Department of Education should fully enforce NCLB 
assessment provisions and provide effective, ongoing and 
adequately funded technical assistance to state education 
agencies in the development of appropriate assessments.
States should focus on developing and implementing 
valid and reliable assessments including native language 
assessments for English language learners.
States as well as school districts and schools should 
develop and implement sound and consistent methods 
for classifying ELLs and the latter should implement 
the best instructional practices that will provide ELLs 
with the best opportunity to learn. Parents and advo-
cates should insist that ELLs continue to be included in 
NCLB accountability systems to ensure that schools will 
focus attention on the academic needs of these students.
communications policy
The FCC, possibly in conjunction with other federal agen-
cies, should conduct a Croson/Adarand analysis to deter-
mine the rationale for race-conscious measures to advance 
equal employment and increase minority ownership in the 
communications industry.
The FCC should review the impact of current ownership 
rules in broadcasting on minority ownership opportunities 
and service to minority communities
More efforts and resources should be directed to improve ac-
cess to telecommunications services on Indian land.
The E-Rate program should help make technology available to 
communities by supporting Community Technology Centers.
The FCC should gather and distribute information that 
will assess the access that all people have to advanced tele-
communications services.
housing
Congress and HUD should take action to remove impedi-
ments to racially and economically integrated housing and 
to actively promote such housing. Among these steps are the 
elimination of financial penalties imposed on Public Hous-
ing Authorities when families move from one jurisdiction 
to another; reauthorization of the program that permitted 
somewhat higher rents in more expensive, lower poverty 
areas; encouragement of cooperation among PHAs operating 
similar voucher programs in the same metropolitan area, e.g. 
offering financial incentives for sharing waiting lists; adopt-
ing common application forms; enactment of a new housing 
mobility program modeled on the successful Gautreaux 
Assisted Housing Mobility Program in Chicago.
The Department of Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service 
should fulfill their responsibility to provide guidance to state 
grantees on fair housing performance. This guidance should 
induce at minimum the collection of racial and economic 
data; advice on affirmative marketing methods to ensure 
access for low-income families of color to low poverty areas; 
the requirement that project siting avoid the perpetuation 
of segregation; IRS disapproval of state use of exclusionary 
techniques that limit development of LIHTC units to high 
poverty areas; encouragement of the use of Section 8 and LI-
HTC together to increase the numbers of housing opportuni-
ties available on a racially and economically integrated basis.
enDnoTes
1 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (193).
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Since its creation as a congressionally mandated unit of 
the Department of Justice in the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 
the Civil Rights Division has been the primary guardian 
for protecting our citizens against illegal racial, ethnic, re-
ligious and gender discrimination. Through both Republi-
can and Democratic administrations, the Division earned 
a reputation for expertise and professionalism in its civil 
rights enforcement efforts. 
During much of the history of the Division, its civil 
rights enforcement work has been highly sensitive and 
politically controversial. It grew out of the tumultuous 
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, a movement which 
generated great passion and conflict. Given the passions 
that civil rights enforcement generates, there has always 
been potential for conflict between political appointees 
of the incumbent administration, who are the ultimate 
decision makers within the Division and the Depart-
ment, and the stable ranks of career attorneys who are 
the nation’s front line enforcers of civil rights and whose 
loyalties are to the department where they work. Career 
attorneys in the Division have experienced inevitable 
conflicts with political appointees in both Republican 
and Democratic administrations. These conflicts were 
almost always resolved after vigorous debate between 
career attorneys and political appointees, with each learn-
ing from the other. Partisan politics was rarely injected 
into decision-making, in large measure because decisions 
usually arose from career staff and, when involving the 
normal exercise of prosecutorial discretion, were generally 
respected by political appointees. In a similar fashion, the 
hiring process for new career employees began with the 
career staff, who made recommendations to the political 
appointees that were generally respected.
During the Bush administration, dramatic change has 
taken place. Political appointees have made it quite clear 
that they did not wish to draw on the expertise and 
institutional knowledge of career attorneys. Instead, there 
appeared to be a conscious effort to remake the Division’s 
career staff. Political appointees often assumed an attitude 
of hostility toward career staff, exhibited a general distrust 
for recommendations made by them and were very reluc-
tant to meet with them to discuss their recommendations. 
The impact of this treatment on staff morale resulted in 
an alarming exodus of career attorneys—the longtime 
backbone of the Division that had historically maintained 
the institutional knowledge of how to enforce our civil 
rights laws, tracing back to the passage of our modern civil 
rights statutes. 
Compounding this problem was a major change in hiring 
procedures, which virtually eliminated any career staff in-
put into the hiring of career attorneys. This has led to the 
perception and reality of new staff attorneys having little if 
any experience in, or commitment to, the enforcement of 
civil rights laws and, more seriously, injecting political fac-
tors into the hiring of career attorneys. The overall damage 
caused by losing a large body of the committed career staff 
and replacing it with persons with little or no interest or 
experience in civil rights enforcement has been severe and 
will be difficult to overcome.
rElationShip of political  
appointEES and carEEr Staff
Brian K. Landsberg was a career attorney in the Civil 
Rights Division from 1964–86 during which he was chief 
of the Education Section for five years and then chief of 
the Appellate Section for 12 years. He now is professor 
of law at McGeorge Law School. In 1997, he published 
Enforcing Civil Rights: Race Discrimination and the De-
partment of Justice (University Press of Kansas), a careful 
and scholarly analysis of the history and operation of the 
Division. Landsberg devoted a full chapter to the “Role of 
Civil Servants and Appointees.” He summarizes the im-
portance of the relationship between political appointees 
and career staff at page 156:
Although the job of the Department of Justice is to 
enforce binding legal norms, three factors set up the 
potential for conflict between political appointees, 
who represent the policies of the administration then 
in power, and civil servants, whose tenure is not tied 
The attack on Professionalism in the Civil rights Division
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to an administration and whose loyalties are to the de-
partment where they work and the laws they enforce: 
the horizontal and vertical separation of powers; the 
indeterminacy of some legal norms; and the lack of a 
concrete client. The vertical separation of powers was 
designed to enable both civil service attorneys and 
political appointees to influence policy. This design, as 
well as wise policy, requires cooperation between the two 
groups to achieve the proper balance between carrying 
out administration policy and carrying out core law 
enforcement duties. Where one group shuts itself out from 
influence by the other, the department’s effectiveness suf-
fers. (emphasis added)
Rather than making efforts to cooperate with career staff, 
it became increasingly evident during the Bush adminis-
tration that political appointees in the Division were con-
sciously closing themselves off from career staff. Indeed, 
on several occasions there was hostility from political ap-
pointees toward those who voiced disagreement with their 
decisions and policies or were perceived to be disloyal. 
This was apparent in many ways:
• Longtime career supervisors who were considered to have 
views that differed from those of the political appointees 
were reassigned or stripped of major responsibilities. In 
April, 2002, the employment section chief and a long-
time deputy chief were summarily transferred to the Civil 
Division. Subsequently, a career special litigation counsel 
in the Employment Section was similarly transferred. In 
2003, the chief of the Housing Section was demoted to 
a deputy chief position in another section and shortly 
thereafter retired. Also in 2003, the chief of the Special 
Litigation Section was replaced. In the Voting Section, 
many of the enforcement responsibilities were taken 
away from the chief and given directly to supervisors or 
other attorneys in the section who were viewed as loyal 
to political appointees. In 2005, the chief of the Crimi-
nal Section was removed and given a job in a training 
program, and shortly after that, the deputy chief in the 
Voting Section for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was 
transferred to the same office. On only one occasion in 
the past had political appointees removed career section 
chiefs, and on that occasion it was on a more limited 
basis. In short, it is rare for political appointees to remove 
and replace career section chiefs for reasons not related 
to their job performance. Never in the past had deputy 
section chiefs been removed by political appointees.
• Regular meetings of all of the career section chiefs 
together with the political leadership were virtually 
discontinued from the outset of the administration. 
Such meetings had always been an important means of 
communication in an increasingly large Division that 
was physically separated in several different buildings. 
• Communication between the direct supervisors of sever-
al sections at the deputy assistant attorney general level 
and section staff also was greatly limited. In the Voting 
Section, for instance, section management was initially 
able to take disagreements in decisions made at the 
deputy assistant attorney general level to the assistant 
attorney general for resolution. But it became increas-
ingly evident that such debate, which is so important 
to the healthy development of policy, was frowned on. 
In 2003, it was made plain that efforts to raise with 
the assistant attorney general issues on which there was 
disagreement would be discouraged. In past adminis-
trations, section chiefs had open access to the assistant 
attorney general to raise issues of particular importance. 
Attempts to hold periodic management meetings with 
political appointees were also usually not acted upon. 
This resulted in political appointees not receiving the 
expertise and institutional knowledge of career staff on 
many matters. Indeed, a political special counsel in the 
front office was assigned to work solely on voting mat-
ters and often assumed many of the responsibilities 
I held as the chief of the section. 
• Communication between sections was also discouraged. 
This was especially true when the appellate section was 
handling the appeals of trial section cases or amicus 
briefs on the subjects handled by a trial section. When 
drafting briefs in controversial areas, appellate staff were 
on several occasions instructed not to share their work 
with the trial sections until shortly before or when the 
brief was filed in court. This was extremely frustrating 
for career staff in both the trial and appellate sections 
and hindered the adequate development of briefs and 
full debate of issues in the briefs.
• Political appointees have inserted themselves into 
section administration to a far greater level than the 
past. For example, on many occasions, assignments of 
cases and matters to section attorneys were made by 
political employees, something that was a rarity in the 
past. Moreover, assignment of work to sections and 
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attorneys was done in a way that limited the civil rights 
work being done by career staff. This was especially true 
of attorneys in the appellate section, where close to 
40 percent of attorney time has been devoted to depor-
tation appeals during 2005.1 Similarly, selected career 
attorneys in that Section were informed that they would 
no longer receive assignments to civil rights cases, and 
disfavored employees in other sections were assigned 
the deportation appeal cases. Political appointees also 
intruded into the attorney evaluation process in certain 
instances, something that did not happen in the past. 
impact on moralE 
of carEEr EmployEES
It is hard to overemphasize the negative impact that this 
type of administration of the Division has had on the 
morale of career staff. The best indicator of this impact 
is in the unprecedented turnover of career personnel. It 
should be noted that the impact has been greater in some 
sections than others, and often attorneys in the sections 
most directly affected by the hostility of political appoin-
tees transferred to other sections in which the impact was 
less. The sections most deeply affected have been voting, 
employment, appellate, and special litigation. 
• Based on a review of personnel rosters in the voting sec-
tion, since April 2005 19 of the 35 attorneys in the sec-
tion (over 54 percent) have either left the Department, 
transferred to other sections (in some cases involuntari-
ly) or gone on details. During the same period, only one 
of the five persons in section leadership (the chief and 
four deputy chiefs) remains in the section today.
• Based on a review of personnel rosters in the employ-
ment section, the section chief and one of four deputy 
chiefs were involuntarily transferred to the Civil Divi-
sion in April, 2002. Shortly after that, a special counsel 
was involuntarily transferred to the Civil Division. Since 
then, two other deputy chiefs left the section or retired. 
Overall, since 2002, the section chief and three of the 
four deputy chiefs have been involuntarily reassigned or 
left the section. In addition, in that period, 21 of the 32 
attorneys in the section in 2002 (over 65 percent) have 
either left the Division or transferred to other sections.
• Loss of professionals—paralegals and civil rights ana-
lysts in both the voting and employment sections—has 
also been significant. In the employment section alone, 
twelve professionals have left, many with over 20 years 
of experience.
• In the appellate section, since 2005, six of the 12–14 
line attorneys in the section transferred to other sec-
tions or left the Department. Two of the transfers were 
involuntary.
There has always been normal turnover in career staff in 
the Civil Rights Division, but it has never reached such 
extreme levels and never has it been so closely related to 
the manner in which political appointees have adminis-
tered the Division. It has stripped the division of career 
staff at a level not experienced before. 
hiring procEdurES
Compounding the impact of the extraordinary loss of 
career staff in recent years has been a major change in 
the Division’s hiring practices. Since 1954, the primary 
source of attorneys in all divisions in the Department 
has been the attorney general’s honors program. This 
program was instituted by then Attorney General 
Herbert Brownell in order to end perceived personnel 
practices “marked by allegations of cronyism, favoritism 
and graft.”2 Since its adoption, the honors program has 
been consistently successful in drawing top law school 
graduates to the Department.
Until 2002, career attorneys in the Civil Rights Division 
played a central role in the process followed in hiring at-
torneys through the honors program. Each year career line 
attorneys from each section were appointed to an honors 
hiring committee which was responsible for traveling to 
law schools to interview law students who had applied 
for the program. Because of the tremendous number of 
applications for the honors program, committee members 
generally would limit their interviews to applicants who 
had listed the Civil Rights Division as their first choice 
when applying. The Civil Rights Division had earned a 
reputation as the most difficult of the Department’s divi-
sions to enter through the honors program because only 
a few positions were open each year and so many highly 
qualified law students desired to work in civil rights.
After interviewing was completed, the hiring committee 
would meet and recommend to the political appointees 
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those who they considered the most qualified. Law school 
performance was undoubtedly a central factor, but a 
demonstrated interest and/or experience in civil rights en-
forcement and a commitment to the work of the Division 
were the qualities that interviewers sought in candidates 
selected to join the career staff of the Division. Political 
appointees rarely rejected these recommendations.
Hiring of experienced attorneys followed a similar process. 
Individual sections with attorney vacancies would review 
applications and select those to be interviewed. They 
would conduct initial interviews and the section chief 
would then recommend hires to Division leadership. Like 
recommendations for honors hires, these recommenda-
tions were almost always accepted by political appointees. 
These procedures have been very successful over the years 
in maintaining an attorney staff of the highest qual-
ity—in Republican as well as Democratic administra-
tions. A former deputy assistant attorney general in the 
Reagan administration, who was interviewed for a recent 
Boston Globe article about Division hiring practices, said 
that the system of hiring through committees of career 
professionals worked well. The article quoted him as 
saying: “There was obviously oversight from the front 
office, but I don’t remember a time when an individual 
went through that process and was not accepted. I just 
don’t think there was any quarrel with the quality of in-
dividuals who were being hired. And we certainly weren’t 
placing any kind of litmus test on…the individuals who 
were ultimately determined to be best qualified.”3
But, in 2002, these longstanding hiring procedures were 
abandoned. The honors hiring committee made up of 
career staff attorneys in the Civil Rights Division was 
disbanded and all interviewing and hiring decisions were 
made directly by political appointees with little or no input 
from career staff or management. As for non-honors hires, 
the political appointees similarly took a much more active 
role in selecting those persons who received interviews, and 
almost always participated in the interviewing process.
Not surprisingly, these new hiring procedures have 
resulted in the resurfacing of the perception of favorit-
ism, cronyism, and political influence which the honors 
program had been designed to eliminate in 1954. Indeed, 
information that has come to light recently indicates that 
in many instances, this is more than perception. In July, 
2006, a reporter for the Boston Globe obtained pursu-
ant to the Freedom of Information Act the resumes and 
other hiring data of successful applicants to the voting, 
employment, and appellate sections from 2001–2006. 
His analysis of this data indicated that:
• “Hiring of applicants with civil rights backgrounds— 
either civil rights litigators or members of civil rights 
groups—has plunged. Only 19 of the 45 [42 percent] 
lawyers hired since 2003 in those [the employment, ap-
pellate, and voting] sections were experienced in civil 
rights law, and of those, nine gained their experience 
either by defending employers against discrimination 
lawsuits or by fighting against race-conscious policies.” By 
contrast, “in the two years before the change, 77 percent 
of those who were hired had civil rights backgrounds.”
• “Meanwhile, conservative credentials [of those hired] 
have risen sharply. Since 2003, the three sections have 
hired 11 lawyers who said they were members of the 
conservative Federalist Society. Seven hires in the three 
sections are listed as members of the Republican Na-
tional Lawyers Association, including two who volun-
teered for Bush-Cheney campaigns.”
The reporter noted that current and former Division 
staffers “echoed to varying degrees” that this pattern was 
what they observed. For example, a former deputy chief 
in the Division who now teaches at the American Uni-
versity Law School testified at an American Constitution 
Society panel on December 14, 2005 that several of his 
students who had no interest in civil rights and who had 
applied to the Department with hopes of doing other 
kinds of work were often referred to the Civil Rights Di-
vision. He said every one of these persons was a member 
of the Federalist Society.5
Early on in the Bush administration, the hiring in the 
voting section was overtly political. In March, 2001, 
after the contested 2000 election, Attorney General 
Ashcroft announced a Voting Rights Initiative. An im-
portant part of this initiative was the creation of a new 
political position—Senior Counsel for Voting Rights—
to examine issues of election reform. Two voting section 
career attorney slots were filled as part of this initiative 
to help this appointee. The decision to create these new 
positions was made with no input from career staff 
and, once the new hires were on board, they operated 
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separately from the voting section on election reform 
legislation. The person named as the Senior Counsel for 
Voting Rights was a defeated Republican candidate for 
Congress. The two line attorneys who filled career attor-
ney slots assigned to the voting section were hired with 
no input from the section and had been active in the 
Republican party. One of those “career” attorneys, Hans 
von Spakovsky, was promoted to a political position in 
2003—special counsel to the Assistant Attorney General. 
For the two and a half years that this attorney held this 
position, he spent virtually all his time reviewing voting 
section work and setting the substantive priorities for the 
section. Although he was clearly in a political superviso-
ry position, he continued to be listed as a voting section 
line attorney and enjoyed career status until he received 
a recess appointment to the Federal Election Commis-
sion in December, 2005.
concluSion
During the Bush administration there was an unprec-
edented effort to change the make-up of the career staff 
at the Civil Rights Division. This has resulted in a major 
loss of career personnel with many years of experience in 
civil rights enforcement and in the invaluable institutional 
memory that had always been maintained in the Divi-
sion until now—in both Republican and Democratic 
administrations. Replacement of this staff through a new 
hiring process resulted in the perception and reality of 
politicization of the Division, and high-profile decisions 
in voting matters have added significantly to this. The 
overall impact has been a loss of public confidence in fair 
and even-handed enforcement of civil rights laws by the 
Department of Justice. 
The damage done to one of the federal government’s most 
important law enforcement agencies is deep and will take 
time to overcome. Crucial to this effort is careful and 
continuous congressional oversight, now and in the future. 
Until November 16, 2006 there had not been a Senate 
Judiciary Committee oversight hearing of the Civil Rights 
Division for over four years. Renewed oversight is required 
to restore the Civil Rights Division to its historic role of 
leading the enforcement of civil rights laws.
enDnoTes
1 See Confirmation Hearings for Wan Kim, October, 2005. Answer No. 12 to Written questions of senator Durbin (“According to available records, it 
is my understanding that during FY 2005, the Appellate Section filed 120 appellate briefs in the Office of Immigration Litigation, and that for the 
first three quarters of FY 2005 for which information is currently available, approximately 38.8% of attorney hours in the Appellate Section of the 
Civil Rights Division have been spent on cases regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act.
2 Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights at p. 157. 
3 Charlie Savage, Civil Rights Hiring Shifted in the Bush Era, July 23, 2006 at A1.
4 Id.
5 American Constitution Society, The Role of Political and Career Employees of the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, December 14, 2005; 
video available at www.acslaw.org.
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During the Clinton years, the Civil Rights Division 
sought to bolster the enforcement program of its Criminal 
Section. Among other things, the Division requested and, 
at the end of President Clinton’s second term, received 
authorization to hire additional lawyers into the Section. 
It also endeavored to bring new attention to the scourge of 
international trafficking in persons, or “human trafficking.” 
Most importantly, the Division pushed successfully for a 
new law, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 
which makes it easier to prosecute criminal misconduct 
involving human trafficking. The TVPA was enacted im-
mediately before the November 2000 presidential election.
With the additional lawyers and the new law, the Criminal 
Section under President Bush has shifted gears. Moving 
away from its traditional focus on prosecuting police mis-
conduct and hate crimes, the Section now prioritizes cases 
involving human trafficking, especially cases involving 
“sex trafficking,” which includes the forced prostitution of 
adult women and any prostitution of minors. Unlike labor 
trafficking cases—which involve the involuntary servitude 
of farm, factory and domestic workers, among others—sex 
trafficking cases did not fall within the Section’s responsi-
bilities prior to passage of the TVPA. 
In the aggregate, the changed emphasis does not appear to 
have had an appreciable effect on the Section’s traditional 
work. Based on both the perceptions of Section staff and the 
difficult-to-assess statistics maintained by the Division, the 
Section continues to prosecute law enforcement misconduct 
and bias crimes at roughly the same clip as in years past. 
Because the Section now employs from 30–50 percent more 
prosecutors than it did in the late 1990s, one might expect 
its efforts in those areas to have increased. But because of the 
changed emphasis, the added, collective muscle provided by 
the new prosecutors has been applied entirely to trafficking 
cases, and mostly to cases involving sex trafficking.
background
The Criminal Section enforces the provisions of the U.S. 
criminal code that protect individuals’ constitutional and 
civil rights. The Section prosecutes cases involving: 
• unwarranted physical and sexual assaults, illegal arrests 
and personal property theft by public officials, such as 
police officers 
• acts of violence and intimidation, motivated by racial, 
ethnic or religious hatred, that interfere with housing, 
employment, voting and public accommodations
• involuntary servitude, compelled labor and forced 
prostitution, each of which often involves international 
trafficking in persons
• acts of violence and intimidation directed at abortion 
providers and clinics
• acts of violence (often arson) targeting houses of reli-
gious worship
Prosecutions involving clinic violence and church desecra-
tion have occurred only since the mid-1990s, when Con-
gress passed laws proscribing such misconduct. Since then, 
these prosecutions have made up only a small percentage 
of the Section’s caseload, which is dominated by matters 
in the other enforcement areas.
Because the Section prosecutes newsworthy cases in-
volving police brutality, hate crimes, human trafficking, 
church arsons and abortion clinic-related violence, its 
work is typically high-profile, often garnering nationwide 
attention and, at the very least, media coverage within the 
jurisdictions where the cases arise. Among the Section’s 
best-known victories are the prosecutions of a Tennes-
see judge who sexually abused female litigants and court 
employees, Los Angeles Police Department officers who 
beat Rodney King, and Ku Klux Klansmen who murdered 
civil rights workers James Chaney, Michael Schwerner and 
Andrew Goodman. 
The Section’s core mission, indeed its historical raison 
d’etre, has been to prosecute hate crimes1 and official 
misconduct2—crimes that disproportionately victimize 
racial minorities. There are historical reasons for involv-
ing the federal government in such cases. Until recently, 
local prosecutors, especially in the South, often lacked the 
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political will and/or the resources to bring cases involving 
racially-motivated violence and intimidation. Similarly, for 
practical reasons, local prosecutors often found it diffi-
cult to investigate and bring charges against wayward law 
enforcement officers, who belong to the very same police 
departments they work with and count on every day. 
Through the years, the Section also has prosecuted severe 
cases of worker exploitation qualifying as “peonage” and 
“involuntary servitude”—crimes that formerly victimized 
African Americans but now mainly victimize foreign na-
tionals brought to the United States.3 The Section’s work 
in this area was once circumscribed by a judicially-crafted 
requirement effectively forcing the government to prove 
that the labor in question was compelled by violence or 
physical restraint. More subtle means of coercion were 
not prosecutable.4 In addition, cases involving either 
forced prostitution or the prostitution of minors were 
prosecuted under statutes that did not fall within the 
Section’s purview. They were handled by other compo-
nents of the Justice Department under the Mann Act5 
and, if they involved illegal aliens, the criminal provisions 
of the immigration laws.6 
In the late 1990s, the Clinton administration sought 
to focus attention on the plight of criminally-exploited 
workers, women and girls, most of whom are now being 
“trafficked” into the U.S. It initiated the multi-agency 
Worker Exploitation Task Force, which was designed 
to coordinate and intensify the federal government’s 
anti-trafficking enforcement activities. The Division also 
worked with Congress to make it easier for prosecutors 
to bring forced labor and prostitution cases. Thanks to 
those joint efforts, the legal landscape regarding worker 
exploitation prosecutions changed. The TVPA, which 
became effective on October 28, 2000, now facilitates 
the prosecution of labor compelled by means of coercion 
less extreme than physical assaults or locked gates, in-
cluding, for instance, threats of “serious harm,” threats of 
deportation, and any “scheme plan or pattern intended 
to cause [the victim] to believe that, if [the victim] did 
not perform … labor or services, [the victim] or another 
person would suffer serious harm …”7 The new law also 
specifically identifies and proscribes “sex trafficking,” 
which involves either: (a) recruiting, enticing, harbor-
ing, transporting or providing women for the purpose 
of prostitution, knowing that the prostitution will be 
compelled by “force, fraud or coercion”; or (b) recruiting, 
enticing, harboring, transporting or providing any minor 
for the purpose of prostitution.8 
Significantly, the Department determined that the 
Criminal Section would oversee the prosecution of 
nearly all offenses arising under the TVPA. This deci-
sion expanded the Section’s enforcement responsibili-
ties, especially insofar as misconduct constituting “sex 
trafficking” had previously been prosecuted and moni-
tored by other DOJ components.
a Shift in EnforcEmEnt 
prioritiES 
When the Bush administration assumed power, the 
political appointees within the Justice Department, and 
particularly within the Civil Rights Division, made a 
conscious effort to prioritize human trafficking prosecu-
tions. The enactment of the TVPA, and the expanded 
authority the Section obtained as a result of it, facili-
tated the new emphasis. Reflecting that emphasis is: a 
ramped-up, trafficking-centered public relations initia-
tive; the dedication of new resources to anti-trafficking 
efforts; and an increased number of trafficking (mostly 
sex trafficking) prosecutions. While still being well-
served, the Section’s core enforcement mission—the 
prosecution of official misconduct and hate crimes—
has not enjoyed a similar boost, despite an increase in 
the number of Section attorneys.
PubLiC reLaTions 
Perhaps the biggest indicator of the Section’s new focus 
is the Department’s substantial push to publicize the 
anti-trafficking program. The public comments of former 
Attorney General Ashcroft and current Attorney General 
Gonzales regarding civil rights enforcement invariably em-
phasize the Section’s efforts to combat trafficking.9 Presi-
dent Bush himself has spoken about the Department’s 
anti-trafficking initiative—the only civil rights enforce-
ment effort he has touted at length.10 The Bush adminis-
tration also built on the Clinton-created Worker Exploita-
tion Task Force, repackaging it as a new initiative called 
the Trafficking in Persons and Worker Exploitation Task 
Force. And just as this report was going to press, Attorney 
General Gonzales convened a briefing to announce the 
creation of a specialized Human Trafficking Prosecution 
Unit, which is housed within the Section.11 
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The home page of DOJ’s Web site highlights the Depart-
ment’s anti-trafficking program.12 An information-filled, 
dedicated jump-page describes the problem of trafficking 
and the Department’s efforts to combat it, with numer-
ous links to additional material.13 The Department also 
regularly publishes a Section-prepared “Anti-Trafficking 
News Bulletin,” which highlights recent prosecutions, 
outreach and training by Department officials, new state 
and federal legislative initiatives, and public statements by 
Department leadership.14 
The core civil rights enforcement work of the Section does 
not enjoy the same level of Department-generated publicity. 
While the information on the Web site regarding the Sec-
tion’s anti-trafficking work is constantly updated, informa-
tion regarding the Section’s other work is rather out of date; 
as of this writing, most of the material, except for the “press 
releases” link, is several years old. Additionally, whereas the 
Department consistently touts the number of trafficking 
prosecutions during the Bush years, it does not publicize 
the statistics regarding its official misconduct and hate 
crimes cases. On the Division’s Web site, statistics regarding 
trafficking prosecutions are readily accessible.15 Statistics 
regarding the Section’s other work cannot be located.
resourCes
In the past few years, the Section has obtained additional 
resources, which it has used to beef up its anti-trafficking 
efforts. Most significantly, in the 1999 and 2000 budget 
cycles, the Division requested and received authority to 
hire new Section lawyers. The reinforcements began arriv-
ing as George W. Bush assumed the presidency. Whereas 
the Section employed 31 prosecutors in FY 1998, it had 
47 by FY 2003.16 It now employs upwards of 50. The 
added manpower has facilitated the transition to a Section 
docket that features an increased number of trafficking 
cases (principally sex trafficking cases), but no appreciable 
difference in other enforcement areas.
In addition, whereas every section attorney and supervi-
sor has traditionally handled every kind of case that the 
Section prosecutes, the Section during the Bush years 
began formally assigning or hiring a handful of mid-level 
managers to work exclusively on trafficking issues. These 
managers occasionally have handled or supervised cases. 
They have spent much of their time, however, traveling 
both nationally and internationally to: coordinate federal 
and local law enforcement efforts to combat human traf-
ficking; educate local, state, federal and foreign officials 
about the trafficking problem; train law enforcement 
agents on investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases; 
and conduct outreach to public officials, non-governmen-
tal organizations and victims’ rights advocates.
On January 31, 2007, as noted above, Attorney General 
Gonzales unveiled plans to expand and formally organize 
this loose-knit group into a specialized team called the 
Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit.17 The Unit, which 
the Section houses, is led by a career Division attorney. 
Other Section attorneys have been tapped to serve as 
special counsels—a couple already enjoyed that title—and 
more prosecutors and support staff will be added shortly. 
All of the attorneys in the Unit will deal exclusively with 
trafficking cases and anti-trafficking policy development.
The Bush administration has not launched similar efforts 
to bolster the Section’s work in other enforcement areas, 
with the exception of the formation of a modest 9/11 
Backlash Initiative.18 Created in response to an increased 
number of ethnically-motivated crimes committed in re-
taliation for the September 11 attacks, the Initiative is de-
voted to investigating and prosecuting criminal civil rights 
violations against Muslims, Sikhs and South Asians, and 
those perceived to be members of those groups. While the 
Department put an experienced Section lawyer in charge 
of the Initiative, it did not bring on any new attorneys to 
help staff it, and only a few Section attorneys have been 
assigned significant investigations generated by it. The 
Initiative has netted a handful of convictions. Many of the 
matters it has monitored have been prosecuted successfully 
by state authorities.
ouTPuT 
Staff Sentiment
While the Section has increased the number of attorneys 
by 30–50 percent over the past seven years, the feeling 
among Section attorneys is that the Section is accomplish-
ing more in one area only—human trafficking. Given that 
the Section received authorization to bring the new hires 
on board at least in part because of the expanded prosecu-
torial responsibilities that the TVPA has provided it, this is 
not entirely surprising, though the new hires were origi-
nally intended to bolster enforcement efforts in other areas 
as well. It is also unsurprising given the FBI’s revamped 
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priorities. Historically, the FBI has been the federal law 
enforcement agency that investigates the crimes the Sec-
tion prosecutes. With its post-9/11 emphasis on terrorism 
investigations, however, many FBI field offices appear not 
to be pursuing the same number of thoroughly-worked 
criminal civil rights investigations as in years past. One 
result has been to allow another federal law enforcement 
agency, the Department of Homeland Security’s Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, formerly INS), 
to step in and partner up with the Section. But ICE has 
taken up the slack only in the one area of criminal civil 
rights enforcement that concerns it—human traffick-
ing. There has not been a corresponding reinforcement of 
investigative resources in traditional enforcement areas.
Section attorneys find that although neither the quan-
tity nor quality of their work in traditional enforcement 
areas has suffered, trafficking cases take up an increasing 
amount of their time because, unlike bias and official 
misconduct cases, which usually involve one or at most 
several discrete incidents, trafficking cases are character-
ized by continuous patterns of criminal behavior spanning 
months or years. Section attorneys with at least a few years 
of experience on the job have borne a particularly heavy 
burden recently, as the departures of a relatively large 
number of experienced lawyers have forced them to pick 
up the slack left by new hires, who require time and guid-
ance to learn to do the job properly. 
Section supervisors also have felt pressured, largely because 
of the increase in trafficking work. They perceive that 
while they spend the same amount of time on traditional 
cases, trafficking cases command an increasing amount 
of their energies, not only because they are supervising 
the trafficking dockets of trial attorneys, but also because 
they are conducting trafficking prosecution training and 
outreach around the country. The recent creation of the 
specialized Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit may 
relieve some of the burden.
Statistics
It is exceedingly difficult to gauge whether the Section’s 
prosecution statistics bear out Section staff’s perception 
that Section output has increased in the trafficking arena 
while remaining largely static in core enforcement areas. 
It should also be emphasized up front that year-to-year 
statistics might not always reflect how productive the Sec-
tion is. A number of variables might cause fluctuations in 
the number of cases filed, and the number of defendants 
charged, from year to year. For instance, the number of 
prosecutable civil rights violations that occur and are 
reported may change; some cases are far more complex, 
and thus far more time-consuming and resource-intensive, 
than others; and the number of cases filed in previous 
years that are still being litigated may take up time and 
resources that would otherwise be devoted to new cases. 
Even assuming that year-to-year statistics at least partly 
reflect how effectively the Section is performing on a 
comparative basis, there are seemingly intractable difficul-
ties in using existing statistics to discern how the Section 
has fared during the Bush years. First, the numbers differ 
depending on which entity has kept them. The statistics 
the Section/Division has kept on the number of cases 
and defendants charged per year: (a) regularly differ from 
those maintained by another Justice Department compo-
nent, the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), 
which monitors prosecutions in every enforcement area, 
including civil rights, all over the country; (b) appear 
to differ from those maintained by the Federal Judicial 
Center’s Administrative Office of the Courts (AO) (“ap-
pear to” because there is a three-month lag between the 
Division’s fiscal year and AO’s calendar year numbers); 
and (c) have not always been entirely internally consistent. 
Perhaps more significantly, it is unclear how any of these 
entities—the Division, EOUSA or AO—count particu-
lar cases as “civil rights cases” in the first place. Do they 
include cases filed only under the statutes over which the 
Section enjoys primary enforcement responsibility? Do 
they include more—i.e., cases resembling those charged 
under such statutes but not actually so charged? 
The following illustrates how the numbers have differed: 
• From FY 2002–2005, the years for which EOUSA data 
are currently published online, the Division and the 
EOUSA have come up with quite different numbers re-
garding new civil rights prosecutions initiated per year. In 
FY 2002, EOUSA reported 81 new cases filed, while the 
Division reported a lesser number, 74. In FY 2003–05, 
though, the Division’s numbers exceeded EOUSA’s:  
57 vs. 51 in FY 2003, 96 vs. 72 in FY 2004, and 83 vs. 67 
in FY 2005.19 The statistics prepared by the Division 
under the Bush administration regarding the number of 
civil rights defendants prosecuted per year also differed 
from those maintained by EOUSA—and, curiously, they 
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uniformly paint a less favorable picture of the Section’s 
output during the final two years of the Clinton admin-
istration than EOUSA did (138 vs. 159 in 1999; 122 
vs. 127 in FY 2000) and a more favorable picture of the 
Section’s output during the Bush years (191 vs. 148 in 
FY 2001; 125 vs. 115 in FY 2002; 123 vs. 81 in FY 2003 
and 151 vs. 110 in FY 2004).20 
• There have also been disparities between the AO’s sta-
tistics and the statistics reported by the Division under 
Bush personnel. Some disparity is inevitable because 
the AO tracks cases on a calendar year basis, while the 
Division does so on a fiscal year basis. The disparities in 
the number of cases filed each year from 1999–2004 are 
generally not very significant, with the exception of 2004, 
where the Division claimed 96 new prosecutions (for FY 
2004), as compared to only 44 for the AO (for calendar 
year 2004).21 The disparities in the number of defendants 
charged each year is greater, however, with the Division’s 
numbers usually coming in much higher: 191 vs. 122 for 
FY 2001 vs. calendar year 2001; 125 vs. 125 for 2002; 
123 vs. 98 for 2003; and 151 vs. 98 for 2004.22 
Whatever the difficulties of statistically assessing how 
productive the Section is now as compared to years 
past,23 the numbers maintained by the Division remain 
the only ones that distinguish among the different kinds 
of cases the Section handles. Neither EOUSA nor the 
AO does so publicly. Accordingly, it is only by looking 
at the Division’s own statistics that one can tell how 
comparatively productive the Section has been in specific 
enforcement areas. 
What the Division’s own numbers show generally validates 
the perceptions of Section lawyers. In the core enforce-
ment areas—official misconduct and hate crimes—the 
number of prosecutions initiated during the last three 
years of President Clinton’s final term roughly average the 
number initiated during the first four years of President 
Bush’s tenure.24 (There was a noticeable dip in official 
misconduct cases filed in FY 2003, which some have 
attributed to the reluctance of the then-principal deputy 
assistant attorney general to prosecute law enforcement 
officials.) In the area of human trafficking, by contrast, 
the number of prosecutions has increased. Most of that 
increase is attributable not to labor trafficking cases, a 
traditional enforcement area, but rather to sex trafficking 
cases, which, prior to the passage of the TVPA, the Sec-
tion did not prosecute, oversee or include in any statistical 
tallies, as noted above.25 
A June 2006 DOJ report on trafficking prosecutions shows 
that the number of sex trafficking cases filed by all DOJ 
components (including cases filed under statutes not falling 
within the Criminal Section’s purview) has climbed steadily 
since the enactment of the TVPA in October 2000: from 
four in FY 2001, to seven in FY 2002, to eight in FY 2003, 
to 23 in FY 2004, to 26 in FY 2005. By contrast, the num-
ber of labor trafficking cases filed (again, including cases 
filed under statutes not falling within the Section’s purview) 
has fluctuated but remained pretty constant: six in FY 2001, 
three in FY 2002, three in FY 2003, three in FY 2004 and 
eight in FY 2005.26 
Nor does the annual number of labor trafficking cases 
filed during the Bush years differ materially from the 
number filed during President Clinton’s second term, 
particularly given that, unlike the Bush administration, 
the Clinton administration did not include in its statisti-
cal tallies forced labor cases prosecuted under statutes that 
the Section was not given primary authority to enforce. 
The Section brought one labor trafficking case under the 
involuntary servitude statute in FY 1996, five in FY 1997, 
one in FY 1998, four in FY 1999 and none in FY 2000.27 
While the Department under the Bush administration has 
gone to some length to publicize the statistics regarding its 
anti-trafficking achievements, it has not similarly publi-
cized the statistics regarding its record in bias crimes and 
official misconduct prosecutions.
Given the Section’s change in emphasis, the increased num-
ber of trafficking prosecutions during the Bush years—how-
ever inexact and marginally useful the statistics—is what 
was or should have been expected. The Section now has 
more lawyers than it did before, and given that the numbers 
in the traditional enforcement areas appear to have re-
mained the same, it stands to reason that the numbers show 
the added manpower provided by the new lawyers to have 
been collectively applied to trafficking cases. Moreover, it is 
unsurprising that the increase is attributable largely to sex 
trafficking prosecutions. Influential political conservatives 
favor prioritizing prosecution of sex-related offenses (take, 
for instance, the Department’s recent push to prosecute 
obscenity), and some believe that the Department should 
employ the new sex trafficking statute to prosecute nearly 
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any form of prostitution, coerced or not. More significantly, 
while the forced labor provision of the TVPA makes it 
marginally easier to prosecute labor trafficking cases than 
pre-TVPA provisions of the criminal code, the provision 
does not make it appreciably easier, so a substantial increase 
in the number of labor trafficking cases may have been too 
much to expect. By contrast, the sex trafficking provision of 
the TVPA opens up to prosecution an entirely new category 
of misconduct that the Section did not address before, so a 
healthy increase in numbers could have been expected. This 
is especially true given that prior to the Bush years, the Sec-
tion never kept track of, and never claimed credit for, forced 
prostitution cases prosecuted under pre-TVPA statutes like 
the Mann Act and the immigration laws.
looking ahEad
The changed emphasis of the Criminal Section during the 
Bush years is not a negative development. Human traffick-
ing is an international scourge that violates the most el-
emental civil and human rights. The Bush administration 
deserves credit for using the TVPA, enacted immediately 
before President Bush’s election, to bring attention to it. 
The Section must remain vigilant, however, in ensuring 
that its new focus, especially on sex trafficking prosecu-
tions, does not adversely affect its traditional mission. 
Crimes involving both racial/ethnic bias and law enforce-
ment misconduct still occur, and they still demand the 
attention of the Section. Local prosecutors, to their credit, 
ordinarily handle bias crimes prosecutions now. But some-
times, as they acknowledge, they lack the expertise and the 
resources that the FBI and the Section bring to bear on 
the investigation and prosecution of such cases. 
Federal prosecutors—Section prosecutors, in particular—
also ordinarily remain better equipped to prosecute official 
misconduct. There are several reasons for this:
• First is the issue of will. Because they need to maintain 
strong working relationships with the law enforcement 
agencies they rely on every day, many local prosecutors 
find it difficult to vigorously prosecute wayward police 
or corrections officers within their jurisdictions. This 
holds especially true for state prosecutors, but it is also 
occasionally true for federal prosecutors in U.S. Attor-
ney’s Offices, who rely on the work of local law enforce-
ment agencies as well. 
• Second is the issue of resources. Taking on official mis-
conduct cases is time-consuming and resource-intensive. 
Local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies are al-
ready stretched thin prosecuting a vast array of criminal 
conduct, and misconduct by law enforcement officers 
understandably does not top their list of priorities. By 
contrast, prosecuting official misconduct remains a 
Justice Department priority, and even after 9/11, the 
Justice Department (including the FBI) has reserved 
vital resources to address the issue. 
• Third is the issue of expertise. Investigating and pros-
ecuting abusive conduct by public officials is a special-
ized area of law enforcement. It is qualitatively differ-
ent from investigating and prosecuting other kinds of 
crimes. Among other things, it requires a different use 
of the grand jury, a different approach to witnesses, and 
a different kind of presentation at trial. Although a 
smattering of local prosecutors may possess the special-
ized knowledge, experience and resources that effectively 
prosecuting official misconduct entails, many do not. 
Section prosecutors and some AUSAs do. 
The Department can ensure that the Section does not 
depart from its traditional priorities by hiring new lawyers, 
of course. But apart from that, there is at least one other 
sensible way for the Department to preserve the Section’s 
historical role: devolving primary prosecutorial respon-
sibility for sex trafficking cases, which are taking up an 
increasing amount of the Section’s workload, to U.S. At-
torneys’ Offices. 
As it now stands, Section attorneys are actively involved 
in most sex trafficking cases country-wide, teaming up 
with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in the jurisdictions where the 
offenses occur. Because of the Section’s expertise, this is 
the way all civil rights prosecutions are ordinarily handled. 
But in the long run, active collaboration seems less essen-
tial to effectively prosecuting forced prostitution cases. 
Prior to the passage of the TVPA, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
handled such cases by themselves, under the Mann Act and 
other relevant statutes, with no help from the Section and 
little or no help from any other litigating component in 
the Criminal Division at main Justice. The sex trafficking 
provision of the TVPA put a new arrow in their quiver, but 
investigating and prosecuting these cases is not much dif-
ferent than before. In fact, many investigations that begin 
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as sex trafficking investigations end up producing evidence 
of ordinary prostitution only—prostitution, in other words, 
that is prosecutable under the Mann Act, immigration laws, 
or local vice laws, but not under the TVPA. It seems, there-
fore, that U.S. Attorneys’ Offices could rather easily assume 
primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting sex 
trafficking cases, with Section attorneys available to assist if 
needed. This is, after all, the way things work in many other 
areas of federal criminal law enforcement. In cases involving 
narcotics, fraud, public corruption, and more, U.S. Attor-
neys’ Offices ordinarily handle prosecutions by themselves, 
with the Criminal Division sections that specialize in each 
area very loosely maintaining oversight and providing as-
sistance when needed. 
Both sex trafficking and ordinary prostitution that initially 
looks like sex trafficking are prevalent. If the Department 
does not consider transferring primary authority for inves-
tigating and prosecuting these crimes from the Section to 
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, it might run the risk of gradually 
transforming the Section into a roving, nationwide vice 
squad. That was not what the Department intended when 
it tapped the Section to take the lead on enforcing the 
TVPA, and it is not consistent with the Section’s tradi-
tional, still-vital mission.
concluSion
The country continues to look to the Civil Rights Division 
to deliver justice to the victims of hate crimes, to combat 
extreme forms of worker exploitation, and to hold abusive 
police officers, corrections officers and mental health 
workers accountable for willfully flouting individuals’ con-
stitutional rights. As important as the Division’s anti-traf-
ficking initiative is, the Division must not lose sight of the 
Criminal Section’s core mission.
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introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits dis-
crimination in employment based upon race, sex, religion 
and national origin. With the enactment of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (1972 Amend-
ments),2 Title VII’s coverage was extended to cover public 
as well as private sector employees. The 1972 Amend-
ments designated the DOJ as the federal agency to enforce 
Title VII against public sector employers, while the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was 
given responsibility for enforcement in the private sector. 
Within the DOJ, the Employment Litigation Section 
(ELS) of the Civil Rights Division is the office delegated 
day-to-day enforcement responsibility of Title VII against 
state and local government employers. 
This chapter discusses the Department of Justice’s en-
forcement of Title VII, with a particular emphasis on the 
period following January 20, 2001. A review of the DOJ’s 
enforcement activity during the Bush administration 
reveals that the number of Title VII lawsuits filed is down 
considerably from prior administrations—both Republi-
can and Democratic—and that the mix of cases filed also 
has changed. Most importantly, the DOJ has reduced 
significantly the number of “disparate impact” cases filed. 
These are cases that seek broad systemic reform of em-
ployment selection practices that adversely affect the job 
opportunities for a traditionally protected group, such as 
African Americans or women. Equally troubling, the De-
partment is filing few cases that allege that African Ameri-
cans are the victims of racial discrimination. The DOJ also 
has reduced its efforts to reach out to groups of employers, 
like fire and police chiefs, and professional groups, such 
as the Society for Industrial Organization Psychologists 
(SIOP) and the International Personnel Management 
Association Assessment Council (IPMAAC) to discuss 
selection procedure assessment and reform. Thus, the 
DOJ is not using its formidable “bully pulpit” to encour-
age voluntary compliance with Title VII by state and local 
government employers. Neither is it seeking input from 
professional organizations that advise employers and help 
them develop and implement selection procedures.
This diminished enforcement program surely has not gone 
unnoticed by the employer community. In the past, the 
DOJ’s vigorous enforcement action and outreach efforts 
pressured employers to take prophylactic measures. In addi-
tion, the DOJ’s reduction in enforcement activity removes 
an incentive for employers to take voluntary measures to 
ensure equal employment opportunities. This self-analysis 
process is not only expensive, it also is often controversial in 
the local community. Without the pressure of government 
oversight, it is far easier for governmental employers to do 
nothing rather than to engage in a self-evaluation of the 
procedures it uses to select employees. 
The importance of the Department of Justice to the effec-
tive enforcement of Title VII cannot be overstated. It is an 
organization with the prestige, expertise, and financial and 
personnel resources to challenge discriminatory employ-
ment practices of state and local government employers. As 
a general rule, private attorneys and public interest organi-
zations lack the financial and staff resources needed to act 
as private “attorneys general” in the Title VII enforcement 
scheme. Since the enactment of Title VII in 1964 and cer-
tainly since the statute was amended in 1972 to extend its 
reach to public sector employers, the DOJ has been the lead 
agency in eradicating employment discrimination. 
The sections that follow describe two methods of dem-
onstrating a violation of Title VII, the statute’s employ-
ment scheme, and the current administration’s record of 
enforcement.
thEoriES of liability for  
EmploymEnt diScrimination
The two most common legal theories of demonstrating  
a violation of Title VII are disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact. 
DisParaTe TreaTMenT
Disparate treatment is the most easily understood type of 
discrimination. The plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence (that is, it is more likely 
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than not) that the discrimination charged was intentional 
or purposeful. Since direct evidence of discrimination rarely 
exists, circumstantial or indirect evidence of discrimination 
is used by the plaintiff to establish a violation of Title VII. 
The most common type of circumstantial evidence is to 
compare how the alleged victim (a minority or a female) of 
discrimination was treated with the treatment accorded a 
similarly situated non-minority or male. Claims of disparate 
impact typically involve individual allegations of employ-
ment discrimination and they constitute the overwhelm-
ingly largest number of Title VII lawsuits. 
 DisParaTe iMPaCT
Unlike disparate treatment, cases brought under a dispa-
rate impact theory do not require evidence of intentional 
discrimination or discriminatory motive. In disparate 
impact cases, the focus is on the effects of the employment 
practice or the criteria on which the employment decision 
was based. For example, does a practice—like a physical 
performance test—eliminate more female than male ap-
plicants? If it does, the burden then shifts to the employer 
to demonstrate that the procedure is a valid predictor of 
successful job performance. 
Disparate impact cases seek to eliminate or modify a 
systemic discriminatory employment practice(s), generally 
are very complex and expensive to pursue, and present 
resource issues for private plaintiffs. For this and other 
reasons, the Department of Justice files most disparate 
impact cases against state and local government employ-
ers and the EEOC files most of the disparate impact cases 
against private employers. 
thE Statutory SchEmE
The DOJ’s enforcement authority derives from sections 
706 and 707 of Title VII.3 
seCTion 06 of TiTLe vii
Section 706 of Title VII authorizes the attorney general to 
file a suit based upon an individual charge of discrimina-
tion that has been referred to the Department of Justice by 
the EEOC. Under Title VII, individuals who believe they 
are the victims of employment discrimination may file a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. If the charge 
of discrimination is against a state or local government 
employer, the EEOC may refer it to the Justice Depart-
ment for a determination that the charge has merit and 
efforts to resolve the matter voluntarily have failed. The 
DOJ receives more than 500 of these referrals each year, 
and after review typically files suit on between 10 and 14 
of them. Even though cases brought pursuant to section 
706 referrals do not affect large numbers of employees or 
may not establish new law, they are nevertheless important 
enforcement vehicles. Among other things, these cases 
often address unique issues of intentional or purpose-
ful discrimination or address issues that members of the 
private bar might not be qualified or able to handle. In 
smaller communities, for instance, members of the private 
bar might not be willing to represent an individual in a 
suit against the local government for fear of retaliation. 
Section 706 cases are always brought under the disparate 
treatment theory of Title VII liability.
 seCTion 0 of TiTLe vii
By contrast, section 707 of Title VII authorizes the Attor-
ney General to bring suit against a state or local govern-
ment employer where there is reason to believe that a 
“pattern or practice” of employment discrimination exists. 
The Attorney General has “self-starting” authority to initi-
ate pattern or practice investigations and cases. That is to 
say, unlike section 706 cases, pattern or practice cases are 
not dependent upon the receipt or referral of a charge of 
employment discrimination to the DOJ. 
Pattern or practice cases are the most important and 
significant cases brought by the DOJ because they have 
the greatest impact. Not only do pattern or practice cases 
affect a large number of employees, they often break new 
legal ground. The number of pattern or practice cases is 
a strong indicator to the employer community that the 
DOJ is actively enforcing Title VII. 
Pattern or practice cases seek to alter employment and se-
lection practices—such as residency requirements, recruit-
ment methods, tests, assignments, and promotions—that 
have the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of 
race, sex, religion, and national origin. Pattern or practice 
cases can be brought by the attorney general under either 
a disparate treatment or a disparate impact theory or both. 
Most commonly, they are brought under the disparate 
impact theory because it is unnecessary to prove discrimi-
natory motive. The challenged employment practices are 
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usually “facially neutral” in the sense that they apply to 
all applicants equally regardless of race, sex, religion or 
national origin. Thus, for example, every applicant has 
to take the same written test or the same physical perfor-
mance test or be a resident of a municipality for a year 
before being eligible for employment. But a look at the 
impact or the effect of such a practice on certain groups 
of applicants may reveal a different picture. A test that on 
its face appears to be fair to all may disproportionately 
and unjustifiably eliminate from consideration a class of 
qualified applicants, such as African Americans or wom-
en. Similarly, requiring applicants to reside in a jurisdic-
tion for a year before becoming eligible for government 
employment may appear to be fair and non-discrimina-
tory because it applies to all applicants. Its effect, how-
ever, may be to disqualify virtually all African American 
applicants because historically the city or municipality is 
a “white” jurisdiction with few or no African American 
residents. The attorney general’s use of his/her pattern or 
practice authority is an important vehicle for challenging 
and hopefully altering such issues.
The attorney general has used his/her section 707 au-
thority successfully to challenge and eliminate a pre-ap-
plication durational residency requirement of 13 mu-
nicipalities in the Chicago and 18 municipalities in the 
Detroit suburbs.4 Each municipality possessed three 
similar characteristics. First, they had few, if any, Afri-
can-American residents. Second, they had a common 
border with a largely African American area of Chicago 
or Detroit. Finally, candidates for municipal employ-
ment had to be residents of the municipality for at 
least one year prior to application. Thus, the residency 
requirement served to exclude from consideration for 
employment significant numbers of African Americans. 
Because the municipalities were not able to demon-
strate that the residency requirement was job-related or 
somehow predictive of successful job performance, the 
practice violated Title VII. 
The DOJ also has used pattern or practice authority to 
reform cognitive tests that disproportionately exclude 
minorities (African Americans and Hispanics) from 
police officer, fire fighter, correctional officer and myriad 
other positions. Similarly, the authority has been used to 
ensure that women have access to physically demanding 
jobs in which they were underrepresented, such as police 
and correctional officer, for which they were otherwise 
qualified. Indeed, historically, the DOJ focused its litiga-
tion efforts on dismantling artificial (non job-related) 
barriers that denied job opportunities to minorities and 
women in such protective service jobs because these 
positions offer prestige, promotional opportunities, and 
excellent pay and benefits. 
Pattern or practice cases often are politically charged and 
highly controversial because they challenge the practices 
used by state and municipal civil service systems. Many 
civil service systems require that employment decisions 
be made using the rank-order results of traditional tests 
of cognitive ability and/or physical performance to select 
and promote protective service personnel. A lawsuit filed 
by DOJ presents a direct assault on these practices and 
may require the defendant to alter its selection practices 
by adopting new tests and to reconsider how it makes em-
ployment decisions. Often the reaction of an employer to 
a lawsuit is that the DOJ seeks to “dumb down” hiring or 
promotion standards and to lower the quality of new hires. 
Indeed, the DOJ’s goal is exactly the opposite. 
Over the years, the DOJ’s litigation has shown that 
most employers have very little objective evidence that 
their selection procedures in fact produce high-quality 
employees. Many employers are satisfied with the status 
quo because it is easier and less expensive not to change. 
And maintaining the status quo does not usually draw 
the wrath of the unions or the public. The threat of a 
legal challenge to employment practices is a powerful 
motivator for an employer to take prophylactic voluntary 
measures. In response to a DOJ investigation or lawsuit, 
employers may retain experts to review and improve 
their current selection practices. The ultimate goal is to 
adopt practices that recruit and select the best applicants 
for employment and have the least discriminatory im-
pact upon protected groups.
Pattern or practice suits are critically important vehicles 
for meaningful and far-reaching reform of employment 
practices that unjustifiably limit employment opportuni-
ties for minorities and women—and the DOJ is the only 
organization that is equipped to bring them. Pattern 
or practice suits are expensive and require substantial 
expertise. Litigation of a pattern or practice suit typically 
requires the use of expert witnesses, such as industrial 
organization psychologists, statisticians, exercise physi-
ologists, and labor economists. It can cost many thou-
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sands of dollars to retain experts for litigation, a cost that 
most private litigants can not bear. Few private parties or 
organizations have the expertise or resources to bring these 
suits. Thus, there is nobody to fill the void if the DOJ fails 
to bring such suits. 
a compariSon of prE- and poSt- 
January 20, 2001 EnforcEmEnt
Since January 20, 2001, the Bush administration has 
filed 32 Title VII cases, or an average of approximately 
five cases per year.5 This number includes five cases 
in which the DOJ intervened in ongoing litigation 
and two cases initiated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Southern District of New York (using its own 
resources).6 By comparison, the Clinton administration 
filed 34 cases in its first two years in office. By the end of 
its term in office, the Clinton administration had filed 
92 complaints of employment discrimination, or more 
than 11 cases per year. Standing alone, the lack of Title 
VII enforcement by the ELS is grave cause for concern. A 
close look at the types of cases reveals an even more dis-
turbing fact, which is a failure to bring suits that allege 
discrimination against African Americans. 
Of the 32 Title VII cases brought by the Bush adminis-
tration, nine are pattern or practice cases, five of which 
raise allegations of race discrimination. Two of the race 
discrimination cases are “reverse” discrimination cases, 
alleging discrimination against whites.7 Another case 
alleges discrimination against Native Americans8 and 
one case was filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of New York.9 Thus, the Employment 
Litigation Section can lay claim to filing exactly one pat-
tern or practice case in five years that alleges discrimina-
tion against African Americans. And that case was not 
filed until February 7, 2006, more than five years into 
the Bush administration.10 In its first two years alone, 
the Clinton administration filed 13 pattern or practice 
cases, eight of which raised race discrimination claims. 
The Bush administration’s record does not fare any bet-
ter when looking at its use of section 706 enforcement 
authority. Twenty-four section 706 cases have been filed 
since January 20, 2001, five of which allege that the 
defendants engaged in race discrimination in violation 
of Title VII. Since the year 2000, the EEOC referred 
more than 3,200 individual charges of discrimination to 
the ELS.11 It is inconceivable that there were only five 
litigation-worthy suits to be filed on behalf of African 
Americans in that group. During its term in office, the 
Clinton administration filed 73 section 706 cases, of 
which 12 alleged violations of race discrimination. 
These statistics show that the current administration 
demonstrably has reduced Title VII enforcement, and 
this is especially true when it comes to bringing actions 
on behalf of African Americans. 
It seems that the reduction in enforcement of anti-dis-
crimination laws is by design and is not limited to the 
DOJ. The Washington Post reported that the EEOC 
workforce has been reduced by 19 percent since 2001, 
that its backlog of unresolved charges of discrimination 
has increased to 47,516 from 33,562 in 2005, and that 
its proposed 2007 budget is $4 million less than 2006.12 
Despite losing resources, approximately 21 percent of 
the cases brought by the EEOC in 2005 contained al-
legations of race discrimination. This statistic is evidence 
that the failure of the DOJ through the ELS to initiate 
race-based litigation is not because of a reduction of 
discrimination against African Americans. Rather, it is 
evidence that the DOJ has made a conscious decision to 
allocate its resources to other areas. 
It is also interesting to note that while the EEOC is 
losing employees and resources, the ELS became top 
heavy with management, which is likely to be part of 
the reason its productivity is way down. The ELS has a 
staff of approximately 60, of whom seven are manag-
ers, 25 are line attorneys, 12 are paralegals and one is a 
trained statistician. The remaining staff provides admin-
istrative support.13 Until 2001, the Section’s management 
team consisted of a section chief and three, occasionally 
four, deputy section chiefs. Today, there is one section 
chief and six deputy section chiefs. This means that there 
is approximately one supervisor for every three high-level 
line attorneys.14 Since supervisors typically do not per-
sonally handle investigations and cases, the inexplicable 
increase in the ELS management team means that there 
are fewer attorneys available to tend to the Section’s Title 
VII enforcement responsibilities. 
The Bush administration’s enforcement of Title VII 
not only has devalued the need to ensure that African 
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Americans are not the victims of race-based employment 
discrimination; it has affirmatively taken measures to 
see that whites are not disfavored. While all citizens are 
entitled to the protections of Title VII, it is also true that 
African Americans have historically and currently been 
the primary victims of employment discrimination. For 
that reason alone the DOJ has always committed substan-
tial resources to ending race-based discrimination against 
African Americans. Additionally, African Americans have 
greater difficulty than whites in obtaining legal representa-
tion and access to the courts. In comparative terms, whites, 
therefore, may not need the DOJ to champion their cause 
to the extent that African Americans usually do. It seems 
incongruous for the DOJ disproportionately to devote its 
limited resources to the filing of two pattern or practice 
“reverse” discrimination cases while at the same time virtu-
ally ignoring the plight of African Americans.
Moreover, the Bush administration seeks to have the 
courts endorse a very restrictive view of Title VII viola-
tions. In an amicus curiae brief filed in Burlington North-
ern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 126 S. Ct. 
2405 (2006), the Solicitor General advocated for a narrow 
interpretation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), that was rejected by the Supreme 
Court. After the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that 
she was a victim of sexual harassment, Burlington North-
ern transferred the plaintiff from the position of fork lift 
operator to the less desirable job of laborer. The plaintiff 
was later suspended without pay for insubordination. The 
solicitor general joined with the employer in that case in 
arguing that the anti-retaliation provision confines action-
able retaliation only to employer action and harm that 
concerns employment and the workplace. The Supreme 
Court held that such a narrow interpretation is inconsis-
tent with the language of Title VII and inconsistent with 
the primary objective of the anti-retaliation provision: to 
provide broad protection to employees who participate in 
Title VII enforcement. In rejecting the solicitor general’s 
interpretation, the Court noted that “[a]n employer can 
effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions 
not directly related to his employment or by causing him 
harm outside the workplace” (original emphasis). The 
administration should be seeking to expand Title VII’s 
coverage and not the other way around. Even a very con-
servative Supreme Court disagreed with the DOJ.
concluSionS & rEcommEndationS
It is vital that the Department of Justice become more vig-
orous and outspoken in the effort to reduce if not eradicate 
employment discrimination. Since assuming office, the 
Bush administration has cut back radically on its enforce-
ment efforts. It has not filed Title VII lawsuits in substantial 
numbers and it appears to have abandoned serious Title VII 
enforcement on behalf of African Americans. 
The Employment Litigation Section should get back to its 
roots. It should reduce the number of managers and there-
by increase the number of attorneys available to perform 
substantive Title VII work. The ELS should file cases at a 
rate comparable with historic levels. This would mean that 
about 14 cases per year would be filed, of which 10–12 
would be section 706 cases and 2–4 would be section 707 
cases. The investigations conducted and cases filed should 
also recognize the reality that discrimination persists 
against African Americans.
Beyond its litigation program, the DOJ needs to demon-
strate leadership by using the bully pulpit. The Depart-
ment needs to reach out and talk to constituent groups 
and help and encourage employers to develop better and 
more job-related selection procedures, which make job op-
portunities available to all qualified applicants regardless 
of their race, sex, religion, or national origin. 
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This article is designed to critique the enforcement record 
of the Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section during the 
Bush administration. Since publication of Rights at Risk 
in 2002, the debate over the federal government’s en-
forcement of voting rights laws has grown very conten-
tious. In 2005 there was extensive newspaper publicity 
indicating politicization of voting rights enforcement by 
the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division and 
the negative impact that this politicization was having on 
the protection of minority voting rights, particularly for 
African Americans. Other articles have reported adver-
sarial attitudes and efforts to marginalize the pre-existing 
career Division management, accompanied by fundamen-
tal changes in the Division’s hiring procedures, by Bush 
political appointees. This article focuses upon the Voting 
Section’s enforcement record. 
background 
enforCeMenT resPonsibiLiTies  
of The voTing seCTion
The mission of the Voting Section historically has cen-
tered upon enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
(“VRA”), the primary federal statute banning racial discrim-
ination in the election process. There are several impor-
tant sections of the VRA that traditionally have been the 
primary focus of the Voting Section’s enforcement program.
First, a critical part of the Voting Section’s work involves 
Section 5 of the VRA. Section 5 requires that jurisdictions 
covered under the special provisions of Section 4 (nine 
states in their entirety and portions of seven other states) 
prove to the Department of Justice or the District Court 
for the District of Columbia that any and all new voting 
procedures will not have either the purpose or the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or membership in a language minority group. Covered ju-
risdictions may not implement new voting procedures un-
less and until such federal “preclearance” is obtained. All 
voting changes submitted to the Department of Justice are 
reviewed by the Voting Section, and if the Section finds a 
violation of Section 5, it forwards a recommendation to 
the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights that a writ-
ten objection be issued prohibiting the jurisdiction from 
proceeding with implementation of the submitted change. 
Similarly, if a covered jurisdiction seeks preclearance by 
filing a Section 5 declaratory judgment action before the 
District Court for the District of Columbia, the Attorney 
General is the sole statutory defendant and the litigation 
is handled by the Voting Section. The Voting Section 
plays a special and critical role in enforcing Section 5 
since minority voters do not have any statutory role in the 
Section 5 administrative or judicial processes, though the 
Voting Section actively solicits comments from minority 
voters when conducting its administrative reviews and 
minority voters often are able to intervene in Section 5 
declaratory judgment lawsuits.
Second, the Voting Section is responsible for enforcing 
Section 2 of the VRA. As amended in 1982, Section 2 sets 
forth a nationwide prohibition on practices and procedures 
that deny individuals an equal opportunity to participate in 
the political process on the basis of race or membership in 
a language minority group. Section 2 is enforced through 
litigation brought by the Justice Department, and also 
frequently is enforced through lawsuits filed by private indi-
viduals and groups. The most complex and important Sec-
tion 2 cases have been the vote dilution cases, and because 
of the Voting Section’s resources and expertise, the Justice 
Department has played a crucial role in the enforcement of 
Section 2. The 1982 amendments to the VRA established 
a “results test” for proving minority vote dilution under Sec-
tion 2. Since then, the most important VRA cases brought 
by the Voting Section have been those challenging at-large 
elections and redistricting plans that dilute African-Ameri-
can, Hispanic and American Indian voting strength. 
Third, Section 203 and Section 4(f )(4) of the VRA , which 
first were passed in 1975, require jurisdictions to provide 
language assistance including bilingual written materials 
and oral assistance if the numbers of limited English profi-
cient Spanish Heritage, Asian American or American Indian 
voting age citizens exceed specified thresholds. 
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Fourth, Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the VRA provide the 
attorney general with the authority to dispatch federal ob-
servers to monitor the voting process in the jurisdictions 
covered under Section 4.
The Voting Section also enforces several other voting rights 
laws not directly addressing discrimination issues—the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA or Motor-Voter) 
and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting 
Act (UOCAVA). 
sTruCTure of The CiviL righTs Division’s 
voTing seCTion
The Voting Section is a component of the Department of 
Justice’s Civil Rights Division. The Voting Section reports 
to the assistant attorney general for civil rights, a presiden-
tial appointee, to whom the attorney general has delegated 
the authority to institute and defend voting rights litiga-
tion on behalf of the United States, and to make adminis-
trative decisions under Section 5 of the VRA. The imme-
diate staff of the assistant attorney general are primarily 
political appointees, although one attorney historically 
has served as a “career” deputy assistant attorney general. 
Typically one deputy assistant attorney general and one 
or more counsel review the recommendations of the 
Voting Section on behalf of the assistant attorney gen-
eral, although the ultimate decision to bring litigation or 
interpose Section 5 objections remains with the assistant 
attorney general.
The Voting Section’s Section 5 work is handled by a staff 
of career attorneys and civil rights analysts, who, together 
with the support staff, are managed by a section chief and 
several deputy chiefs. A principal deputy position was 
created in 2005. Career attorneys also fill several special 
counsel positions. The deputy chiefs and special counsel 
supervise particular investigations, litigation and other 
matters. The Voting Section also has carried a staff of 
social science professionals, which recently has included a 
geographer, a statistician and a historian.
From the early 1980s a single deputy chief has been des-
ignated to supervise the crucial Section 5 administrative 
review process, although as of January 2007 that position 
had been unfilled for a number of months. The Section’s 
staff of career civil rights analysts is dedicated to reviewing 
Section 5 administrative submissions; the Section’s attor-
neys also review the more complex administrative submis-
sions as required. It has been a longstanding practice to 
assign several career attorneys to serve as full-time “attorney-
reviewers” to assist the Section 5 deputy in supervising the 
review of Section 5 administrative submissions by attorneys 
and analysts. Approximately 40 percent of the Section’s staff 
has been allocated to Section 5 responsibilities.
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background information
Section 5 applies mostly, but not exclusively, to states lo-
cated in the South and Southwest. As enacted in 1965 and 
amended in 1970, jurisdictions were covered based upon 
their use of literacy tests and other discriminatory devices 
that were known to have been used to bar African Ameri-
can citizens from registering and voting. In 1975, Section 5 
coverage was extended to jurisdictions that administered 
their elections only in the English language in a manner 
that inhibited participation by language minority citizens. 
Currently, the covered areas include Alabama, Arizona, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, three of New York City’s 
five boroughs, forty of North Carolina’s one hundred coun-
ties, South Carolina, Texas, and all of Virginia except for 
a few counties and independent cities that recently have 
been released from coverage, as permitted by Section 4 of 
the VRA. In addition, Section 5 covers a small number 
of counties in California, Florida and South Dakota, and 
townships in Michigan and New Hampshire.1 
The Section 5 preclearance requirement applies to any and 
all types of voting changes that the covered jurisdictions 
enact or seek to initiate. This includes changes that have 
the potential to dilute the opportunity of minority citizens 
to cast an effective vote, such as redistrictings, changes in 
the method of electing officials (including changes to at-
large elections, majority-vote requirements, and provisions 
limiting or prohibiting the use of single-shot voting), and 
annexations and other changes in jurisdictions’ boundar-
ies. It also includes changes regarding the administration 
of elections, including changes in voter registration proce-
dures, polling place procedures, early voting and absentee 
voting procedures, polling places and early voting loca-
tions, the procedures for providing election information in 
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languages other than English, and candidate qualifications 
and qualification procedures.2 
As a matter of practice, jurisdictions almost always choose 
the Justice Department route to preclearance because it is 
substantially faster, cheaper, and simpler than initiating 
a case in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 
The Justice Department’s records reflect that, since 1965, 
Section 5 jurisdictions have submitted over 440,000 vot-
ing changes to the Justice Department but have filed only 
sixty-eight preclearance lawsuits involving perhaps several 
hundred voting changes.
Section 5 nondiscrimination Standards
As noted, Section 5 prohibits covered jurisdictions from 
enacting or seeking to administer voting changes that 
have a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory effect. 
The specific meaning of these two nondiscrimination 
standards has been the subject of recent controversies 
and is discussed below.
First, the Section 5 effect standard prohibits covered 
jurisdictions from implementing any voting change 
that “would lead to a retrogression in the position of 
racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise 
of the electoral franchise.”3 Pursuant to this standard, 
an “effects” analysis is conducted by comparing minority 
voters’ relative electoral opportunities under the new and 
the pre-existing provisions. A change has a discrimina-
tory effect if it would worsen minority electoral oppor-
tunity, but does not have that effect if it either would 
improve minority opportunity or leave that opportunity 
unchanged. A non-retrogressive voting change does not 
violate the Section 5 effect standard even if it fails to 
allow minority voters an equal and nondiscriminatory 
opportunity to participate in the political process.4 
Historically, both the courts and the Justice Department 
have applied the retrogression standard to those changes 
that potentially might dilute minority strength by focus-
ing on the effect of the changes on the ability of minor-
ity voters to elect candidates of their choice. However, 
in 2003 the Supreme Court substantially reinterpreted 
this approach in its controversial five-to-four decision 
in Georgia v. Ashcroft. The Court held that while the 
retrogression analysis would continue, in part, to include 
consideration of the impact of a change on the ability of 
minority voters to elect candidates of their choice, it also 
must include consideration of the impact of the change 
on the opportunity of minority voters to influence (but 
not decide) elections, and the impact of the change on 
the ability of representatives chosen by minority voters 
to exert leadership, influence, and power once they enter 
into the legislative body to which they were elected.5 
This revision of the retrogression standard raised substan-
tial concern that it would allow discriminatory changes 
to be precleared and, furthermore, that it did not pro-
vide a workable basis on which to analyze the effect of 
submitted voting changes. As a result, in 2006 Congress 
amended Section 5 (as part of a Section 5 reauthoriza-
tion, discussed below) to return the retrogression stan-
dard to the previous “ability to elect” focus. 
The Section 5 purpose standard historically has been 
implemented by the courts and the Justice Department to 
complement the effect standard by broadly interpreting it 
as prohibiting the implementation of voting changes that 
have any discriminatory intent, regardless of whether the 
intended harm is retrogression or vote dilution. In 2000, 
however, in another controversial 5–4 decision, the Su-
preme Court in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board held that 
discriminatory purpose under Section 5 only could have a 
much more limited meaning: henceforth, only an intent to 
cause retrogression would violate Section 5 and other dis-
criminatory purposes no longer would be prohibited.6 This 
effectively read the purpose standard out of Section 5 since, 
as reinterpreted, the standard now added little or nothing to 
the prohibition on retrogressive voting changes contained 
in the Section 5 effect standard.7 The Court’s holding in 
Bossier Parish School Board also effectively reversed several 
prior decisions of the Court that held that the Section 5 
purpose standard applies to any and all discriminatory 
purposes, and was not limited to retrogressive purpose.8 In 
response, Congress amended Section 5 in 2006 to return 
the purpose standard to its former meaning, so that it now 
again prohibits the implementation of voting changes that 
have any discriminatory purpose.
Prior to 1997, the Justice Department also reviewed 
voting changes to determine whether they complied 
with other provisions of the VRA, including Section 2 
and Sections 4(f )(4) and 203. However, in that year the 
Supreme Court held, this time by a 7–2 vote, that such 
reviews are not permitted by Section 5.9 This reinterpre-
tation of Section 5 was not altered by Congress in the 
2006 legislation.
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The bush aDMinisTraTion
Two things stand out with regard to the Bush adminis-
tration’s administrative enforcement of Section 5. First, it 
has interposed very few Section 5 objections. As discussed 
below, this appears to be the result of forces outside the con-
trol of the Justice Department, and, with the notable excep-
tions discussed below, does not appear to be a consequence 
of the manner in which the Bush administration has exer-
cised its discretionary enforcement authority. Second, the 
Bush administration’s stewardship of the Section 5 preclear-
ance process in certain high profile submissions has been 
highly politicized and, as a result, the Justice Department 
made inappropriate decisions and damaged its credibility.
the low number of Section 5 objections
From 2001 through 2005, the Justice Department in-
terposed objections to a total of only 48 voting changes 
contained in 40 separate submissions made by Section 5 
jurisdictions. The extent to which this represents an 
historically low number of objections is made clear when 
one compares the number of objections interposed during 
this five-year period to previous five-year periods dating 
from 1981 though 1995. As indicated by the following 
table, the number of objections remained high until the 
mid-1990s, when there was a sharp drop-off in objections 
that has continued to the present day.10 
It does not appear that the low number of Section 5 objec-
tions during the Bush administration generally is the result of 
any failure on the part of the Justice Department to vigor-
ously enforce the preclearance requirement. As noted, the 
number of objections noticeably began to decrease during the 
Clinton administration, when the Justice Department was 
seeking to enforce Section 5 to its full extent. The conclusion 
that the Justice Department’s enforcement approach gener-
ally is not responsible for the low objection numbers also is 
supported by the experiences of two of the authors of this 
essay who, up until recently, occupied leadership posts in the 
Voting Section of the Department’s Civil Rights Division.
The lower number of objections during the Bush adminis-
tration also is not attributable to a decrease in the overall 
number of preclearance submissions to the Justice Depart-
ment. From 2001 to 2005, Section 5 jurisdictions submit-
ted over 81,000 voting changes to the Department in a 
total of almost 25,000 submissions. These numbers are 
comparable to the submission numbers for the previous 
five-year periods included in the preceding data table.
Instead, the lower number of objections appears to be the 
result of other factors. First, the Supreme Court’s 2000 deci-
sion in Bossier Parish School Board appears to have exacted 
a heavy toll on the Justice Department’s ability to interpose 
objections. Prior to that holding, an increasing percentage 
of the Department’s objections were to nonretrogressive 
voting changes and were based on the Section 5 purpose 
standard. During the 1980s, a little over a fourth of the 
objections fell in that category and, in the 1990s, a little 
over a half did so.12 The Department particularly relied on 
the purpose standard in interposing objections to redistrict-
ing plans: about a third of the Department’s objections 
to post-1980 redistricting plans were to nonretrogressive 
plans and were based on discriminatory purpose; and in the 
1990s over four-fifths of the redistricting objections fell in 
that category.13 In addition, from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s, the Department interposed a significant number 
of objections based on discriminatory purpose to changes 
from at-large election methods to mixed systems of districts 
and at-large seats.14 The number 
of objections to redistrictings 
and mixed election systems 
initially fell in the mid-1990s, 
when the post-1990 Census 
redistricting cycle ran its course 
and the number of jurisdictions 
changing from at-large elections 
also substantially slowed. However, following the 2000 
Census, it is likely that a larger number of objections again 
would have been interposed to non-retrogressive, intention-
ally discriminatory redistricting plans but for the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bossier Parish School Board, given the 
history of Section 5 redistricting objections following the 
previous two censuses.
Second, it appears that the reduction in the number 
of objections beginning in the mid-1990s also may be 
attributed to the success the VRA has enjoyed in requir-
ing or encouraging local governments in the covered 
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areas to abandon their at-large election systems in favor 
of single-member district systems, or mixed district/
at-large systems, that better reflect minority voting 
strength. Historically, the three types of voting changes 
that have accounted for the great majority of the Justice 
Department’s Section 5 objections are annexations, elec-
tion method changes, and redistrictings. Annexation 
objections typically have been based on the retrogressive 
effect of annexing white population in the context of an 
at-large method of election and racially polarized vot-
ing; a substantial portion of the Department’s election 
method objections similarly have been based on retro-
gression and the use of at-large elections in the context 
of polarized voting (i.e., objections to the adoption of 
at-large elections, and the adoption of provisions such 
as majority-vote requirements and numbered posts that 
may limit minority electoral opportunity when added 
to a pre-existing at-large system). During the 1980s 
and into the 1990s, a large number of counties, cities 
and school districts in the covered areas changed from 
at large to district or mixed election systems as a con-
sequence of Congress’ adoption of the Section 2 results 
standard in 1982, and also as a result of Section 5 
objections to annexations and other changes.15 This may 
have increased the possibility of the covered jurisdic-
tions enacting discriminatory redistricting plans, but it 
has substantially reduced the number of discriminatory 
annexations and election method changes that recently 
have been adopted. 
There are other, somewhat more speculative explana-
tions that could be offered for the reduction in the 
number of Section 5 objections over the past ten years. 
First is the increased deterrent effect of Section 5.16 In 
other words, it may be that the covered jurisdictions 
are doing a better job at avoiding discriminatory voting 
changes because they are paying more attention to Sec-
tion 5 during the process of adopting voting changes. 
Second, some might argue that jurisdictions are doing 
a better job because of a sea change in attitudes toward 
minority participation in the political process as minor-
ity registration has dramatically increased in covered 
jurisdictions. Third, and related to the above explana-
tions, there has been an increase in the number minor-
ity elected officials (largely due to the election method 
changes noted above), and such representation has 
increased the ability of the minority community to suc-
cessfully oppose discriminatory voting changes. 
the politicization of Section 5
Historically, the Justice Department has adhered to a strong 
institutional norm against efforts to inject partisan politi-
cal considerations into its Section 5 decision-making.17 
This has been a significant accomplishment given that its 
preclearance decisions can directly affect who gets elected 
to office, particularly its decisions regarding redistrictings, 
election method changes, and annexations. The political 
appointees in the Bush administration, however, have failed 
to maintain this high standard of conduct. In a series of pre-
clearance determinations regarding voting changes of great 
importance to minority voters, the Justice Department has 
corrupted the Section 5 process by allowing partisan politics 
into the Section 5 decision-making calculus.
The influence of politics first became apparent only a few 
months after the Bush administration’s political leadership 
of the Civil Rights Division was put in place in the sum-
mer of 2001. In December 2001, the Justice Department 
was asked by the State of Mississippi to review its plan for 
redrawing its congressional districts in light of the 2000 
Census. In conducting this review, the Department pro-
ceeded to use the Section 5 process to enable the Republi-
can Party of Mississippi to substitute its plan for the state’s 
plan. The Department took this action not because of any 
discrimination concerns associated with the state’s plan, 
but rather simply because the Republican plan would bet-
ter enable President Bush’s party to elect congresspersons 
from this state.18 
The somewhat complicated chain of events that set the 
stage for the Justice Department’s Section 5 decision-mak-
ing on the Mississippi plan is as follows. Under state law, 
the Mississippi legislature was responsible for enacting a 
new congressional redistricting plan, but failed to do so. 
A Mississippi state court then ordered a plan into effect 
a plan that was favored by the state Democratic Party. 
Because the state court is an arm of the state government, 
the new plan had to receive Section 5 preclearance to be 
implemented, and accordingly the State of Mississippi 
submitted this plan to the Justice Department for review. 
However, the Republican Party brought its own lawsuit 
in federal district court, and the federal court entered into 
the fray by stating that it would order into effect its plan, 
drawn by the state Republican Party, if the state court plan 
was not precleared by the Department of Justice by Febru-
ary 27, 2002. This at first did not seem to be noteworthy 
since the State’s December 2001 submission to the Justice 
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Department gave the Department ample time to review 
the state plan by the February 27, 2002 deadline (Sec-
tion 5 grants the Department 60 calendar days in which 
to conduct administrative reviews, and that 60-day period 
was due to expire before February 27). Indeed, Voting Sec-
tion staff attorneys quickly reviewed the state court plan 
and, when that review demonstrated that the plan did not 
adversely affect minority voters, they recommended that 
the Department grant preclearance. 
Nonetheless, political appointees in the Assistant Attorney 
General’s office rejected the preclearance recommendation, 
notwithstanding the fact that they failed to identify any 
discrimination concerns with regard to the plan submitted 
by the State. Instead, they ordered that the Department 
exercise its authority to extend the review period beyond 
the February 27 deadline by asking the State on February 
14, 2002, to provide a substantial amount of additional 
written information with regard to the fact that it was a 
state court, rather than the state legislature, that had ad-
opted the new plan. This change in the enacting authority 
was technically a voting change (because the state court 
previously had not been thought to have the authority to 
order a state congressional plan into effect) and this voting 
change technically needed to be precleared by the Depart-
ment in order for the Department to preclear the state’s 
new congressional plan. However, there was no reason 
to believe that it was discriminatory for a state court to 
have the authority to order a new plan into effect if and 
when the state legislature fails to carry out its redistricting 
responsibility. As a result of this “more information” letter, 
the February 27 deadline passed without a final preclear-
ance decision by the Justice Department on the state plan, 
and the federal court ordered its plan into effect. 
The Justice Department’s request for additional informa-
tion was highly irregular first because, as noted, the De-
partment was seeking information that almost certainly 
was not going to affect the its ultimate preclearance 
decision.19 In addition, the decision to request addition-
al information was irregular because it was made by the 
Civil Rights Division’s political staff over the unanimous 
recommendation of the Division’s career staff to preclear 
the state court plan as well as the change in the author-
ity of the state court. It is extremely unusual and per-
haps unprecedented for the Division’s political staff to 
override a unanimous staff recommendation to preclear 
a submitted change.
In 2003, partisan political concerns again played an 
important role in the Justice Department’s preclearance 
of the controversial mid-decade Congressional redistrict-
ing plan enacted by the State of Texas. This was the highly 
partisan plan that had been adopted by the state legis-
lature at the urging of then Republican House Majority 
Leader Tom DeLay. It was drawn in 2003 after an initial 
post-2000 plan had been implemented by a federal district 
court in 2001 (following the Texas legislature’s failure to 
adopt a new plan). The 2003 plan was designed solely to 
increase the voting strength of the Republican Party in 
Texas (and it eventually resulted in the gain of five con-
gressional districts for Republicans). However, in order to 
accomplish this end, the plan targeted several areas of mi-
nority voting strength, which had the effect of both limit-
ing the opportunity of minority voters to elect candidates 
of their choice to Congress and their opportunity to exert 
a substantial influence in congressional elections.20 As a 
result, the career staff of the Voting Section concluded in 
a detailed, lengthy memorandum that the plan violated 
Section 5 because it resulted in a retrogression of minor-
ity electoral opportunity.21 Nonetheless, the Department’s 
political appointees precleared the plan.22 
In 2005, the Justice Department precleared a Georgia 
law requiring voters to present government-issued picture 
identification in order to vote at the polls on election day. 
The enactment represented one of the leading examples of 
legislation advocated by a number of Republicans across 
the country to deal with alleged problems of fraudulent 
voting at the polls but which would erect barriers to 
voting that particularly would harm minority voters. The 
Voting Section staff prepared a detailed memorandum 
recommending an objection. Included in the memo was 
reference to an explicitly racial statement by a state legis-
lator who was the sponsor of the legislation. The legislator 
said, “if there are fewer black voters because of this bill, 
it will only be because there is less opportunity for fraud” 
and added that “when black voters in her black precincts 
are not paid to vote, they do not go to the polls.”23 Yet, 
the very next day the Department precleared this law 
even though it received additional information from the 
State on that same day that was not fully analyzed. Con-
trary to the normal procedure within the Department, 
the staff memorandum recommending an objection was 
not forwarded to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights for consideration prior to him making the final 
preclearance decision.24 
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Historically, the Justice Department has avoided partisan 
application of the preclearance requirement in large part 
because of the well-established, bottom-up, process ap-
plied to Section 5 decision-making. Under this process, 
the nonpolitical career staff of the Civil Rights Division 
is solely responsible for investigating and making recom-
mendations on all Section 5 submissions, and the staff’s 
analyses frame each preclearance determination in terms 
of the law of Section 5 and the facts pertinent to the spe-
cific submitted change. This has had the effect of steering 
the political staff to make appropriate Section 5 deci-
sions based upon the law and the facts, and not based 
upon partisan interests.
The rejection of the staff recommendations in each of 
the high profile and sensitive matters discussed above is 
an historical anomaly. In both Democratic and Repub-
lican administrations the political staff almost always 
has agreed with staff recommendations to interpose 
an objection and, as noted, it is extremely unusual for 
the political staff to reject a recommendation that a 
submitted change be precleared. In the few instances 
when staff recommendations to deny preclearance 
have been rejected by political appointees during past 
administrations, memoranda or written explanations 
of the reasons for such rejections were prepared by 
political decision-makers for career staff to provide the 
legal rationale for the decision and to make a complete 
record of the decision-making process to guide future 
Section 5 decisions. This longstanding deliberative 
process also has played an important role in ensuring 
that inappropriate political factors do not influence Sec-
tion 5 decision-making. However, in each of the above 
instances in which staff recommendations were rejected, 
political staff did not prepare any such explanation 
for their rejection of the staff recommendations. This 
not only deviated from longstanding practice but also 
reflected the chasm that had grown between career and 
political staff in the Bush administration.
Compounding this break from well-established process 
was the Department’s response to staff memoranda 
with which they disagreed. As reported in The Washing-
ton Post in December 2005, Voting Section leadership 
instituted a new rule requiring that staff members who 
review Section 5 voting submissions limit their written 
analysis to the facts surrounding the matter and pro-
hibited the career staff from making recommendations 
as to whether or not the Department should impose an 
objection to the voting change.25 This is a radical change 
in the Voting Section’s Section 5 analytical practices, 
undermining the bottom-up decision-making process 
developed over the past thirty years. This is especially 
disturbing in light of the series of decisions discussed 
above because prohibiting staff recommendations on 
submissions increases the ability of political appointees 
to make politically-motivated preclearance decisions 
without appearing to repudiate career staff directly. The 
abandonment of the process does serious damage to a 
principled administration of the law.
In sum, the Bush administration has abused the author-
ity entrusted in the Justice Department to fairly and 
vigorously enforce Section 5 of the VRA, and thereby 
protect the voting rights of our nation’s minority citizens, 
by allowing partisan political concerns to influence its 
decision-making. This has damaged the Section 5 process, 
undermined the credibility of the Justice Department and 
the Civil Rights Division, and resulted in discriminatory 
voting changes being precleared.
Section 5 declaratory Judgment actions
During the Bush administration, Section 5 jurisdictions 
have filed five declaratory judgment actions in the District 
Court for the District of Columbia seeking preclearance 
of particular voting changes. All but one of these law-
suits was dismissed when the changes were addressed by 
the Justice Department in administrative reviews. The 
one lawsuit that was litigated, in part, was the Georgia 
v. Ashcroft case discussed above. The State sought judicial 
preclearance of its 2001 congressional, state house of 
representatives, and state senate redistricting plans. The 
Justice Department agreed that the congressional and state 
house plans were entitled to preclearance, and opposed 
preclearance of the state senate plan only with regard 
to the manner in which three senate districts had been 
redrawn. The district court agreed with the Justice Depart-
ment that the state senate plan should not be precleared26 
but, for the reasons noted above, the Supreme Court 
vacated the district court’s decision. On remand, the suit 
was dismissed after the State’s interim senate plan (which 
had a population deviation nearly identical to the 2001 
plan at issue in the D.C. case) was found unconstitutional 
in a separate case by a federal court in Georgia based upon 
a one-person, one-vote violation, and thus the D.C. Court 
did not address the legality of the 2001 plan on remand.
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the Substance of the  
reauthorization legislation
In July 2006, Congress enacted and President Bush signed 
into law the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta 
Scott King Voting Rights Reauthorization and Amendments 
Act of 2006, reauthorizing Section 5 for an additional twenty-
four years, until 2031. The previous reauthorization of Sec-
tion 5, in 1982, had extended the statute until 2007.27 As is 
discussed in further detail below, the legislation also extended 
the language minority requirements of Sections 4(f) and 203 
until 2031 and 2032, respectively, and extended to 2031 the 
authority of the Attorney General to send federal observers 
to monitor elections in the Section 5 jurisdictions.28 
The 2006 legislation made two important changes to the 
Section 5 nondiscrimination standards, as discussed above, 
while retaining the statute’s existing geographic and subject-
matter coverage limitations and the existing preclearance 
procedures. The legislation overrides the Supreme Court’s 
re-interpretation of the Section 5 purpose standard, in the 
2000 Reno v. Bossier Parish case, by specifying that “[t]he 
term ‘purpose’ . . . shall include any discriminatory purpose.” 
Accordingly, the test for discriminatory purpose under Sec-
tion 5 is again the same as the constitutional test under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and is no longer 
restricted to the question of whether covered jurisdictions 
were motivated by a purpose to retrogress minority voting 
strength. The legislation also generally overrides the Supreme 
Court’s recent re-interpretation of the Section 5 effect stan-
dard, in Georgia v. Ashcroft, by specifying that the question of 
retrogressive effect is to be analyzed by focusing on “the abil-
ity of [minority] citizens to elect their preferred candidates 
of choice.” Accordingly, it appears that a voting change that 
retrogresses the opportunity of minority voters to elect their 
preferred candidates no longer can be justified by arguing 
that the change increased the number of minority “influence” 
districts and/or by arguing that the change increased the 
power of legislators aligned with minority legislators.29 
As was also noted above, the reauthorization legislation 
does not override the Supreme Court’s ruling in the 
1997 Bossier Parish case that preclearance denials may 
not be based solely on violations of other provisions 
of the VRA, such as Section 2 or Section 203. Such an 
amendment was not proposed in Congress and was not 
sought by civil rights groups.
the legislative process
Initially, the reauthorization legislation had broad bipar-
tisan support. After extensive oversight hearings were 
held in the fall of 2005 by a subcommittee of the House 
Judiciary Committee, the bill to reauthorize Section 5 
(and reauthorize Sections 4(f ) and 203, and the Attorney 
General’s election-observer authority) was introduced in 
the House on May 2, 2006 by the Republican Chairman 
of the House Judiciary Committee, James Sensenbrenner. 
The bill gained 152 co-sponsors, including, most signifi-
cantly, the Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, the 
Minority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, and the ranking minority 
member of the Judiciary Committee, John Conyers. The 
next day, an identical bill was introduced in the Senate by 
the Republican Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Arlen Specter, and gained 57 co-sponsors, including the 
Majority Leader, Bill Frist, the Minority Leader, Harry 
Reid, and the ranking minority member of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy. The legislation ap-
peared to be on its way to almost certain enactment when, 
a few weeks thereafter, it was overwhelmingly approved by 
the House Judiciary Committee by a vote of 33 to one.
The legislative process, however, then became more 
complicated and the end result more uncertain. In late 
June, the House leadership sought to call the bill up for 
consideration on the House floor but a large group of Re-
publican representatives revolted, expressing opposition to 
retention of the existing geographic coverage provisions of 
Section 5 and opposition to continuation of the bilingual 
balloting requirements of Sections 4(f )(4) and 203. As a 
result, the leadership reversed course and refused to bring 
the bill to the floor. This action raised a substantial ques-
tion as to whether the leadership in the House or Senate 
would give either body the opportunity to vote on this 
legislation in 2006.
The legislative tide turned again, however, after several weeks 
of discussion, negotiation, and lobbying by outside groups, 
and the bill was finally brought to the House floor in mid-
July. The House then defeated four amendments that would 
have altered and undermined the legislation, including 
amendments that sought to substantially restrict the geo-
graphic coverage of Section 5 and an amendment that would 
have deleted the extension of the bilingual balloting require-
ments. The latter proposal received the most support, being 
defeated by a vote of 185 to 238. The House then passed the 
legislation on July 13, 2006, by a vote of 390 to 33.
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Almost immediately thereafter, the opponents of the bill 
in the Senate decided to forego any effort to defeat or 
significantly amend the legislation. The bill sped through 
the Senate Judiciary Committee (which previously had 
held several hearings on reauthorization) to the Senate 
floor, and on July 20, 2006, the Senate joined the House 
in approving the legislation by a vote of 98 to zero. The 
President signed the legislation on July 27, 2006.
During the legislative process, President Bush and the 
Justice Department expressed general support for an ex-
tension of Section 5 and strongly supported extension of 
the bilingual balloting provisions, but took a passive role 
in terms of obtaining congressional passage. The Justice 
Department’s relative silence was particularly notable and 
of concern given its role as the principal draftsman of the 
VRA in 1965, and as the principal entity responsible for 
enforcing both Section 5 and the bilingual provisions. In 
reauthorizing Section 5 in the past, Congress always had 
looked to the Department to provide specific data about 
the nature and scope of the Department’s preclearance 
decisions during the preceding authorization period and it 
had provided extensive data and otherwise participated in 
the legislative process. However, during the recent reau-
thorization process, the Department made a conscious 
decision in 2005 not to gather and prepare the necessary 
data, although the Department knew that it was reason-
ably likely that reauthorization would be considered by 
Congress in 2006. While the Department eventually did 
provide data to Congress once the hearings began, its 
initial decision resulted in its abandoning its historical 
position of playing a central role in the passage and reau-
thorization of the VRA and raised considerable concern 
among congressional proponents and civil rights groups as 
to what the Department’s eventual position would be.
challenges to the constitutionality 
of reauthorizing Section 5
Prior to Congress reauthorizing Section 5, there was a 
great deal of discussion among law professors and legal 
practitioners as to whether Congress possessed the author-
ity under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to 
extend the term of Section 5 beyond 2007. The Supreme 
Court has twice rejected broad challenges to the consti-
tutionality of Section 5,30 and rejected a third “as applied” 
constitutional challenge.31 Nonetheless, there is a sub-
stantial question as to whether the Supreme Court would 
conclude that this fourth reauthorization of Section 5 
satisfies the current test for assessing congressional author-
ity to adopt civil rights legislation pursuant to the Civil 
War Amendments. This test specifies that Congress only 
may enact remedies that are “congruent and proportional” 
to the unconstitutional conduct that is to be prevented or 
remedied.32 Precisely how this test applies to the reauthori-
zation, rather than the original enactment, of a civil rights 
remedy, and, in particular, how this test applies to the 
reauthorization of Section 5, is not clear.
Shortly after the 2006 renewal, a lawsuit was filed chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the 2006 reauthorization. 
As required by Section 14(b) of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 
1973l(b), the suit was filed in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia. At this time this case is pend-
ing before a three-judge court in that court.33 Although 
Congress assembled a compelling factual record that fully 
supports the reauthorization of Section 5, the Justice 
Department’s failure to make its best case for doing so 
during the legislative process is likely to haunt its efforts in 
defending this and other such challenges.
seCTion 2 of The vra
Until the Bush administration, the investigation and pros-
ecution of racially discriminatory election practices under 
Section 2 of the VRA was a priority of the Voting Section, 
especially after 1982, when Congress amended Section 2 to 
its current form. After six years in office, the Bush admin-
istration has brought fewer Section 2 cases, and brought 
them at a significantly lower rate, than any other adminis-
tration since 1982. The fact that Section 2 enforcement has 
now come to a virtual standstill reflects a decision by the 
administration that developing these cases—and especially 
Section 2 cases on behalf of African American and Ameri-
can Indian voters—should not be a priority. 
While Section 2 most often is thought of as applying 
to at-large elections systems or redistricting plans, it 
is applicable to a variety of election practices. For the 
Department of Justice, which cannot institute litigation 
based solely upon the Constitution, Section 2 provides 
the jurisdictional basis to challenge intentional racial 
discrimination in the voting process. Nevertheless, chal-
lenges based upon minority vote dilution have been the 
primary application of amended Section 2, and the Bush 
administration’s Section 2 enforcement record has been 
the point of repeated criticism. 
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The Voting Section filed a total of 33 Section 2 cases 
(involving vote dilution and/or other types of claims) 
during the 77 months of the Reagan administration that 
followed the 1982 amendment of Section 2; eight were 
filed during the 48 months of the Bush I administra-
tion; 34 were filed during the 96 months of the Clinton 
administration; while ten were filed so far during the 
first six years of the Bush II administration.34 Thus, the 
overall rate of Section 2 claims per year for the current 
administration is the lowest among any administration 
following the 1982 Amendments; in descending order 
they were Reagan: 5.1 per year; Clinton: 4.25 per year; 
Bush I: 2 per year; Bush II: 1.67 per year. 
However, in considering the current administration’s Sec-
tion 2 record, the most relevant comparison is between 
the final six years of the Clinton administration and the 
six years elapsed to date in the Bush II administration.35 
This comparison shows a clear disparity between the num-
ber and types of Section 2 cases the Voting Section filed. 
A total of 22 cases were filed under Section 2 during the 
final six years of the Clinton administration (a rate of 
3.67 cases per year). Fourteen of those cases raised vote 
dilution claims: six on behalf of black citizens, four on 
behalf of Hispanic citizens and four on behalf of Ameri-
can Indian citizens.36 Three of the eight cases raising 
other types of Section 2 claims involved Hispanics, two 
involved African Americans, two involved American 
Indians, one involved Asian Americans and one involved 
Arab Americans37 (see Table 1). 
The comparable data for the current administration show 
a total of 10 Section 2 cases of any type, only five of which 
involved vote dilution claims.39 Three of those five vote di-
lution cases involved Hispanic voters, while the other two 
concerned African American voters. Among the current 
administration’s five other cases invoking Section 2, four 
stated claims on behalf of Hispanic citizens, one raised a 
claim on behalf of Asian citizens and one was on behalf of 
white citizens40 (see Table 2). 
Furthermore, the statistics provided above are, if anything, 
overly charitable toward the Bush administration, be-
cause two of the four vote dilution cases filed during this 
administration in 2001 resulted from investigations dur-
ing the Clinton administration. United States v. Crockett 
County, Tennessee, one of only two cases filed on behalf 
of African Americans since 2001, more fairly should be 
attributed to the Clinton administration because it was a 
case investigated and approved for pre-suit negotiations 
during the final months of the Clinton administration, 
with the complaint and completed consent decree then 
filed in April, 2001 shortly after the beginning of the Bush 
administration. Similarly, United States v. Alamosa County, 
Colorado, brought in 2001 on behalf of Hispanic vot-
ers, was like Crockett County fully investigated during the 
Clinton administration.41 
These patterns clearly indicate that targeting Section 2 vote 
dilution violations has not been a priority for this admin-
istration. It is equally clear that Section 2 cases involving 
African American and American Indian citizens are not 
a priority for the current administration. Whereas eight 
of the 22 Section 2 cases filed in the last six years of the 
Clinton administration were on behalf of African American 
citizens, and six were on behalf of American Indians, only 
two Section 2 cases of any type have been filed by this 
administration on behalf of African American citizens and 
none has been 
filed on behalf of 
American Indian 
citizens.42 
There are strong 
reasons for the 
Voting Section to 
continue to tar-
get, investigate 
and prosecute 
Section 2 violations, especially vote dilution violations. 
First, solely as a policy matter, the Department of Justice 
has been charged by Congress to enforce Section 2. While 
the Department has legitimate discretion to prioritize its 
efforts, it abuses that discretion if it chooses to disregard 
enforcement of major civil rights laws entrusted to it. 
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In addition, the Voting Section historically has had the 
resources and experience to pursue Section 2 cases based 
solely upon their merit. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to be confident that ju-
risdictions that were in compliance with Section 2 in the 
past will necessarily stay that way. Fact patterns in juris-
dictions often change over time, sometimes for the better, 
but in other cases giving rise to violations that were not 
previously evident. Demographic patterns obviously can 
change over time, in which case the first Gingles precon-
dition—requiring proof that a majority-minority district 
can be drawn—may cease to be a barrier to establish-
ing a Section 2 claim.43 Moreover, increases in minority 
population and/or minority candidates unfortunately 
are often accompanied by increased racially polarized 
voting by members of the white community who feel 
threatened by such changes; this also would reinforce 
a Section 2 claim. For example, the Department’s 2005 
Osceola County case involved a jurisdiction in which the 
Hispanic population increased from twelve percent in 
1990 to 29 percent in 2000; the lawsuit’s claim of inten-
tional discrimination was based upon the County’s rever-
sion from single-member districts to at-large elections for 
its county commission.
In other cases, minority groups that historically had only 
limited involvement in the electoral process may run into 
the barrier of racially polarized voting when they attempt 
to increase their participation. This often is the case with 
American Indians. Indeed, the Voting Section brought a 
series of Section 2 vote dilution cases involving American 
Indians in the late 1990s, including one which led to a 
major victory in Blaine County, Montana.45 More recently, 
the ACLU has brought a series of Section 2 vote dilution 
cases on behalf of Indian voters, most recently against 
Fremont County, Wyoming.46 Despite the very successful 
precedent of the Blaine County case, the Voting Section’s 
efforts to investigate the Fremont County matter were 
rejected by political appointees.47 
Language MinoriTy enforCeMenT 
An analysis of cases demonstrates that the enforcement of 
the language minority requirements of the VRA has been 
by far the top priority of the Voting Section in the current 
administration.48 Indeed, the number of language minor-
ity cases filed in recent years increased significantly, and of-
ficials of the Civil Rights Division invariably point to this 
record when other aspects of their enforcement activities 
are questioned. 
The current administration has brought a total of 20 lan-
guage minority cases, all but one of which followed the pub-
lication of the July 25, 2002 Section 203 language determi-
nations.49 All 20 cases involved Spanish-language claims; two 
cases included additional claims involving Asian-language 
groups.50 Sixteen 
of these twenty 
cases raised 
claims under Sec-
tion 203, 13 of 
which involved 
language groups 
that had been 
covered under 
Section 203 since 
at least 1992.51 
Two cases were brought against counties in Texas under 
Section 4(f)(4), under which the defendant jurisdictions had 
been covered since 1975.52 Three cases brought language 
claims under Section 2.53 Seven of these cases also included 
related claims under Section 208 of the VRA, which requires 
voting officials to permit voters who, among other things, do 
not have the ability to read or write (including read or write 
the English language) to have persons of their choice assist 
them when voting.
By contrast, the Clinton administration brought a total 
of seven language minority cases, three of which were 
brought during its final 65 months.54 In all seven cases the 
language assistance claims were based upon Section 203. 
Three cases involved Spanish-language assistance, three 
involved Indian-language assistance and one involved 
Chinese-language assistance. 
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enforCeMenT of oTher voTing LaWs
national voter registration act
Since the effective date of the NVRA on January 1, 1995, 
the Voting Section has litigated several types of NVRA cases. 
The initial set of cases in 1994 and 1995 dealt primarily 
with constitutional challenges to the Act, which were re-
solved in favor of the NVRA’s constitutionality.55 Since this 
initial round of litigation, the Voting Section has brought a 
total of nine additional cases under the NVRA, one under 
the Clinton administration and the remainder under the 
current administration. Of the cases filed during the Bush 
administration, one dealt with the procedures for voter reg-
istration at Tennessee public assistance and driver licensing 
offices.56 Two cases concerned the question of whether the 
NVRA’s agency-based registration requirements applied to 
particular New York State agencies.57 
The six remaining NVRA cases have been based upon Sec-
tion 8 of the NVRA, which requires election officials to 
conduct a uniform general program to remove ineligible 
registered voters from the rolls.58 The Voting Section’s most 
recent NVRA cases—United States v. New Jersey, United 
States v. Maine, United States v. State of Indiana and United 
States v. State of Missouri—appear to establish a new direction 
in the Voting Section’s NVRA enforcement. The complaints 
in these cases allege that these states have failed to comply 
with Section 8 of the NVRA because they have failed to take 
required steps to remove ineligible voters from the voter rolls 
in a number of counties. Unlike the Voting Section’s two pre-
vious cases based upon Section 8 of the NVRA (United States 
v. City of St. Louis and United States v. Pulaski County), the 
New Jersey, Maine, Indiana and Missouri cases do not allege 
that the registration procedures at issue harmed the voting 
process by causing delay or confusion or by interfering with 
the ability to cast an effective ballot.59 In short, the emphasis 
on enforcement of Section 8 of the NVRA is directed toward 
removing names from registration lists. This stems from a 
concern that failure to purge ineligible voters increases the 
potential for vote fraud. However, none of these cases alleges 
instances of vote fraud in the complaint.60
help america vote act
The Help America Vote Act was enacted in the wake of 
the controversies following the 2000 general election. 
HAVA contained several provisions that are judicially 
enforceable, including requirements for the election day 
process (including the use of provisional ballots under 
certain circumstances, voter notices and voting machine 
requirements) and for election administration (in the form 
of a requirement for statewide voter registration databases). 
The Voting Section has filed six cases containing HAVA 
claims,61 and a seventh case was brought by the United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.62 
In conjunction with language minority claims under 
Section 203 of the VRA, the Cochise County, San Benito 
County and Westchester County cases included claims that 
the defendants had not posted polling place signs advising 
voters of their rights and obligations as required by HAVA; 
the San Benito County case also included a claim that 
the County had failed to provide voters with a written 
description of the provisional ballot process.
The New Jersey, Maine, New York and Alabama cases all 
allege that the States have violated Section 303(a) of HAVA 
by failing to implement official statewide computerized 
voter registration lists.63 The New York and Maine cases raise 
the additional claim that the State has failed to acquire new 
HAVA-compliant voting machines with federal funds it had 
received for that purpose, while the Alabama case alleges 
that the State also violated Section 303(b) of HAVA by fail-
ing to implement the required voter registration forms and 
matching procedures. In these cases there is no real dispute 
that the States have failed failure to implement the required 
statewide voter registration databases; the principal question 
appears to be how the Court will fashion remedies and how 
vigorous the Department will be in pursuing such relief.
The Department also filed several controversial amicus cur-
iae briefs in HAVA cases that further indicate the politiciza-
tion of decision-making on voting matters discussed above 
with respect to Section 5. In the weeks preceding the 2004 
presidential election, the Civil Rights Division unsuccess-
fully argued in three amicus filings involving HAVA’s pro-
visional ballot requirement in Ohio, Florida and Michigan 
that private citizens could not enforce any rights under 
HAVA in the federal courts; that is, the Department took 
the position that it alone could enforce HAVA.64 
These filings are extremely troubling. First, the Division 
historically has been in favor of private plaintiffs having 
access to the federal courts in order to vindicate their right 
to vote, and the Division’s briefs went beyond the facts of 
these cases to attempt to restrict any private enforcement 
of the HAVA statute. Furthermore, while the Civil Rights 
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Division filed these briefs without an invitation from the 
Court, it can hardly be said that the Division had a com-
pelling argument to interject into these cases: the Sixth 
Circuit utterly rejected DOJ’s central argument that “a 
privately enforceable right may be conferred only with text 
that is ‘clear and unambiguous.’ HAVA comes nowhere 
near that high mark.” (United States’ Brief at 19), finding 
that “[t]he rights-creating language of HAVA § 302(a)(2) 
is unambiguous.” Sandusky County Democratic Party v. 
Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2004)65 
Second, the timing of these briefs so close to a major elec-
tion on a highly charged partisan issue in states under-
stood to hold the balance in the 2004 presidential election, 
and taking a position advocated by the Republican Party, 
all added to the perception that the Divison’s voting rights 
decisions were driven by political considerations. Histori-
cally, the Department has avoided taking positions in 
politically charged voting matters so close to an election to 
avoid this message being sent.
uniformed and overseas citizens  
absentee voting act
The current administration has brought a total of seven 
cases under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 
Voting Act (UOCAVA)—two each in 2002, 2004 and three 
in 2006.66 This is comparable to the record of the Clinton 
administration, which brought a total seven UOCAVA cases, 
five of which were filed during its last 65 months.67 
Most states and jurisdictions have adjusted their election 
schedules and procedures so as to provide adequate time 
for overseas citizens to apply for, receive and return their 
absentee ballots in time to have them counted. Thus, 
many of the Voting Section’s cases under UOCAVA have 
occurred under the deadline of approaching elections 
when it becomes apparent that special circumstances 
have delayed the mailing of absentee ballots. Nevertheless, 
the Voting Section’s North Carolina suit in 2006 and its 
Georgia suit in 2005 concerned those States’ general law 
provisions for federal primary elections. 
concluSion
The enforcement record of the Voting Section during the 
Bush administration is troubling for several reasons. First, 
partisan political factors have played a significant role 
in some of its most sensitive decisions. Over its 37-year 
history of the Voting Section, its career staff earned an 
outstanding reputation for professionalism and expertise 
in their enforcement of the VRA and other federal vot-
ing rights laws. Furthermore, the Section has developed 
procedures and processes that have been very successful in 
guarding against even the perception of political factors 
entering into enforcement decisions. This reputation has 
been severely damaged during this administration because 
of several controversial decisions and changes in tradition-
al processes. The widespread perception and appearance of 
partisan favoritism has undercut the Division’s credibility 
and threatens the long-term mission of the Voting Section.
Second, until this  administration, elimination of 
discrimination against African Americans has always 
been the central priority of the Section’s enforcement 
program. The VRA was passed to strengthen the federal 
government’s role in fighting race discrimination against 
African Americans. Over the years, the mission of the 
Division expanded as the VRA was amended to protect 
other ethnic minorities and other voting rights laws were 
passed putting additional enforcement responsibilities on 
the Section. But, until this administration, combating 
discrimination against African Americans has remained 
a central priority of the Division through both Republi-
can and Democratic administrations. The enforcement 
record of the Voting Section during the Bush administra-
tion indicates this traditional priority has been down-
graded significantly, if not effectively ignored. 
Third, enforcement of the primary nationwide anti-dis-
crimination provision of the VRA—Section 2—has been 
significantly reduced. It certainly is appropriate for priority 
to be given to Section 203 enforcement, especially because 
the continued growth and increased civic involvement of 
language minority voting populations reinforce the need for 
an active program. But, it would be incorrect to argue that 
making Section 203 enforcement a priority requires a de-
emphasis of Section 2 enforcement, especially to the extent 
that this has happened during this administration.
Congress has conducted only limited oversight of the Civil 
Rights Division’s voting enforcement during the current 
administration. Given the concerns that surface when re-
viewing the Voting Section’s enforcement record, increased 
congressional oversight now and in the future is crucial to 
restoring the appropriate role of the Department of Justice 
in the enforcement of federal voting rights laws. 
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the effect” of discriminating. It does not appear that this is a substantive change.
30 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173–80 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329, 335 (1966).
31 Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 283–84 (1999).
32 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
33 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v. Gonzales, C.A. No. 1-06CV01384 (D. D.C., filed August 4, 2006).
34 It would be misleading to suggest that the number of potential Section 2 cases has remained constant since the 1982 Amendments. Many jurisdic-
tions with substantial minority populations and polarized voting abandoned at-large election systems in order to remedy or forestall Section 2 claims, 
and redistricting plans now usually are drawn so as to avoid Section 2 liability. Therefore, it is to be expected that the number of Section 2 cases will 
be lower than during the 1980s.
35 The first two years of the Bush II administration covered the post-2000 redistricting cycle, which required a substantial commitment of Voting 
Section resources, even at some cost to Section 2 enforcement. However, the Clinton Administration made a comparable commitment of resources 
during 1995 and 1996 to cases involving claims under the new doctrine of Shaw v. Reno and defense of the NVRA and so it is fair to compare these 
two time periods. 
36 The six cases raising Section 2 vote dilution claims on behalf of African-American citizens were: United States v. Lee County, Mississippi (1995); 
United States v. City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana (1996); United States v. City of New Roads, Louisiana (1996); United States v. Marion County, Georgia 
(1999); United States v. City of Morgan City, Louisiana (2000); and United States v. Charleston County, South Carolina (2001). The four cases raising 
Section 2 vote dilution claims on behalf of Hispanic citizens were: United States v. City of Lawrence, Massachusetts (1998); United States v. City of Pas-
saic, New Jersey (2000); United States v. City of Santa Paula, California (2000); and United States v. Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District, 
California (2000). The four cases raising Section 2 vote dilution claims on behalf of American Indian citizens were: United States v. Blaine County, 
Montana (1999); United States v. Benson County, North Dakota (2000); United States v. Roosevelt County, Montana (2000); and United States v. State 
of South Dakota (2000). 
37 United States v. Day County and Enemy Swim Sanitation District (1999) raised claims of intentional discrimination against American Indians in the 
process of establishing the boundaries of a special purpose district. United States v. Bernalillo County (1998) involved claims of discrimination in the 
selection of American Indian poll workers, while United States v. City of Passaic (2000) raised similar claims with regard to Hispanic poll workers. 
United States v. Board of Elections of City of New York (1997) involved claims of discrimination against black and Hispanic voters by poll workers who 
helped coach white voters. Grieg and United States v. City of St. Martinville (2000) involved a cross-claim by the United States on behalf of black vot-
ers alleging that the City was denying the right to vote on account of race by failing to adopt a lawful redistricting plan and cancelling its elections. 
United States v. City of Cicero (2000) involved claims of intentional discrimination against Hispanic candidates. United States v. Alameda County, 
California (1995) concerned Asian American poll worker hiring; the case also raised a Section 203 claim. United States v. City of Hamtramck (2000) 
involved poll workers who participated in voter challenges to all Arab American citizens attempting to vote in a city election.
38 The total number of Section 2 cases filed was twenty-two; however, one case (New York City Board of Elections) stated Section 2 claims on behalf of 
both Hispanic and African-American citizens, and the total number of claims therefore is greater than the number of cases.
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39 The three cases raising Section 2 vote dilution claims on behalf of Hispanic citizens were: United States v. Alamosa County, Colorado (2001); United 
States v. Osceola County, Florida (2005); and United States v. Town of Port Chester, New York (2006). The two cases raising Section 2 vote dilution 
claims on behalf of African-American citizens were: United States v. Crockett County, Tennessee (2001); and United States v. City of Euclid, Ohio 
(2006). The current Civil Rights Division press officers occasionally refer to Section 2 cases that the Division has “litigated”; this term appears to be 
intended to include cases filed in the previous Administration, such as United States v. Charleston County, South Carolina, which was filed at the end 
of the Clinton Administration. Given that the Charleston County case was exceptionally strong—as shown by the fact that the district court granted 
partial summary judgment to the United States on the three “Gingles preconditions”, leaving only the totality of the circumstances for trial—it is  
good, but hardly remarkable, that the Administration allowed it to go forward. 
40 Among the five cases raising other types of Section 2 claims, United States v. Osceola County, Florida (2002), United States v. Berks County, Pennsylva-
nia (2003) and United States v. City of Boston, Massachusetts (2006), each included claims that the defendant jurisdictions (which were not other-
wise covered under the language minority provisions of the VRA) violated Section 2 by failing to provide bilingual assistance; the Osceola County 
and Berks County cases stated claims on behalf of Hispanic citizens, while the Boston case raised Section 2 claims on behalf of Hispanic as well as 
Asian American citizens. These cases also identified the hostile treatment of voters as supporting their Section 2 claims. United States v. Long County, 
Georgia (2006) was based upon challenges to the eligibility of Spanish-surnamed voters. United States v. Ike Brown and Noxubee County, Mississippi 
(2005), involved the claim that a black Democratic county chairman in Mississippi was targeting white voters for differential treatment; this was the 
first case brought by the Department of Justice alleging discrimination against white voters.
41 The only other Section 2 vote dilution case brought on behalf of African Americans by the Bush II Administration—United States v. City of Euclid, 
Ohio—was filed in July, 2006, only after significant adverse publicity about the Administration’s voting rights enforcement record. United States v. 
Osceola County, Florida, which was brought in 2005 on behalf of Hispanic voters, was an especially strong case which included a claim of intentional 
discrimination as well as a results claim. The court in the Osceola County case initially granted the Department’s motion for a preliminary injunction 
of at-large elections pending trial, and later issued final judgments in the Departments’ favor on both liability and remedy in the fall of 2006. 
42 Further highlighting the low priority given to cases to protect African-American voters is the Noxubee County, Mississippi, Section 2 case filed in 
2005—the first case in which the Voting Section ever alleged discrimination against white voters. Regardless of the merits of the discrimination 
claims in Noxubee County, it is ironic that at a time when no voting cases developed by the Bush Administration on behalf of African-American 
voters had been filed, the first case on behalf of white voters was filed in Mississippi. 
43 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the Supreme Court distilled the analysis of vote dilution claims under amended Section 2 to require 
that three initial conditions must be satisfied before a Court would be required to assess the totality of the circumstances. The first precondition re-
quires that the minority population in a jurisdiction be sufficiently numerous that it can comprise a majority in a properly-apportioned single-mem-
ber district. The second precondition requires proof of minority voter cohesion, and the third requires proof that white bloc voting usually leads to 
the defeat of minority voters’ candidates of choice. 
44 The total number of Section 2 cases filed was ten; however, one case (City of Boston) stated Section 2 claims on behalf of both Hispanic and Asian-
American citizens, and the total number of claims therefore is greater than the number of cases.
45 United States v. Blaine County, Montana, 363 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004). The current Administration pursued a vigorous defense of the district court 
judgment and the constitutionality of Section 2 as applied to Indians during the appeal of the case.
46 Large v. Fremont County, No. 2:05-cv-00270-ABJ (D. Wyo.). 
47 Ironically, attorneys from the Civil Rights Division’s Appellate Section intervened in the Fremont County case in 2006 on the limited issue of the 
constitutionality of Section 2. 
48 In 2002 the Bureau of the Census released a new set of Section 203 covered jurisdictions as determined by the application of the statutory coverage 
formula to the 2000 Census data. The effort to ensure compliance with the new determinations was repeatedly identified as a high priority for the 
Voting Section. 
49 The Voting Section has brought the following language minority cases during the current Administration: United States v. City of Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania (2006); United States v. City of Springfield, Massachusetts (2006); United States v. Brazos County, Texas (2006); United States v. Cochise County, 
Arizona (2006); United States v. Hale County, Texas (2006); United States v. Ector County, Texas (2005); United States v. City of Boston, Massachusetts 
(2005); United States v. City of Azusa, California (2005); United States v. City of Paramount, California (2005); United States v. City of Rosemead, 
California (2005); United States v. Ventura County, California (2004); United States v. Yakima County, Washington (2004); United States v. Suffolk 
County, New York (2004); United States v. San Diego County, California (2004); United States v. San Benito County, California (2004); United States 
v. Brentwood Union Free School District, New York (2003); United States v. Berks County, Pennsylvania (2003); United States v. Orange County, Florida 
(2002), and United States v. Osceola County, Florida (2002). In addition, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York brought 
United States v. Westchester County, New York (2005). 
50 United States v. San Diego County included a Section 203 claim on behalf of Filipino voters; United States v. City of Boston included a Section 2 claim 
on behalf of Chinese and Vietnamese voters. 
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51 With regard to the United States v. San Diego County case, San Diego County had been covered for Spanish language since 1992 but was not covered 
for Filipino assistance until 2002. United States v. Yakima County involved a county that was not covered under Section 203 until 2002. United 
States v. Cochise County involves a county that was covered under Section 203 from 1975 until 1992, and then became covered again in 2002.
52 The United States v. Brazos County and United States v. Ector County cases were brought under Section 4(f )(4). 
53 United States v. City of Boston raised claims under Section 2 with regard to Chinese-language and Vietnamese-language assistance; United States v. 
Berks County and United States v. Osceola County both raised claims under Section 2 with regard to Spanish-language assistance.
54 United States v. City of Lawrence, Massachusetts (1998) (Spanish); United States v. Passaic City and Passaic County, New Jersey (1999) (Spanish); United 
States v. Bernalillo County, New Mexico (1998) (Indian); United States v. Alameda County, California (1995) (Chinese); United States v. Socorro County, 
New Mexico (1993) (American Indian); United States v. Cibola County, New Mexico (1993) (American Indian); United States v. Metropolitan Dade 
County, Florida (1993) (Spanish).
55 United States v. State of Michigan (1995); Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States (1995); United States v. State of Mississippi (1995); United States v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1995); United States v. State of Illinois (1995); Condon v. Reno (1995); Wilson v. United States (1994).
56 United States v. State of Tennessee (2002).
57 United States v. State of New York (2004); United States v. State of New York (1996).
58 United States v. State of New Jersey (2006); United States v. State of Maine (2006); United States v. State of Indiana (2006); United States v. State of Mis-
souri (2005); United States v. Pulaski County, Arkansas (2004); United States v. City of St. Louis, Missouri (2002).
59 The St. Louis and Pulaski County cases both concerned so-called “inactive voter” lists and the procedures that eligible voters had to follow in order to 
vote if their names appeared on the inactive list.
60 Because the district court in the State of Missouri case held that the Missouri Secretary of State was not a proper defendant for the claims in the case, 
it appears that if the case is to go forward it will require separate litigation against each of the counties. This would raise issues of whether significant 
Voting Section resources should be devoted to this type of litigation, where no specific harm has been alleged.
61 United States v. State of New Jersey (2006); United States v. Cochise County, Arizona (2006); United States v. State of Maine (2006); United States v. 
State of Alabama (2006); United States v. New York State Board of Elections (2006); United States v. San Benito County, California (2004).
62 United States v. Westchester County, New York (2005).
63 In November 2005 the Voting Section reached an out-of-court agreement under which the State of California agreed to implement a temporary 
plan and a long-term permanent plan to establish the computerized statewide voter registration list required by HAVA. 
64 Memorandum By The United States As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss And Brief In Support Thereof, Bay County 
Democratic Party v. Land (No. 04-10257-BC) and Michigan State Conference Of NAACP Branches. v. Land (No. 04-10267-BC) (E.D. Mich.); Mem-
orandum Of The United States As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss And Brief In Support Thereof, Florida Democratic 
Party v. Glenda Hood (No. 04:04cv395 RH) (N.D. Fla.); Brief For The United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant And Urging Reversal, 
The Sandusky County Democratic Party v. J. Kenneth Blackwell (Nos. 04-4265, 04-4266) (6th Cir.). These briefs are available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/
voting/hava/hava.html.
65 Similarly, the District Court in the Florida case found that HAVA “clearly creates a federal right enforceable under §1983.” Florida Democratic 
Party v. Glenda Hood, supra, slip op. at 10. And, in the Michigan case, the District Court found that HAVA §302(a)(2) “unambiguously creates in 
the voter the right to cast a provisional ballot under certain circumstances. Bay County Democratic Party v. Land and Michigan State Conference Of 
NAACP Branches v. Land, supra, slip op. at 28. These cases, of course, had very strong partisan overtones—arising in the electorally-critical States of 
Ohio, Michigan and Florida—and the Division’s position consistently was favorable to the Republican defendants. 
66 United States v. State of Connecticut (2006); U.S. v. State of North Carolina (2006); United States. v. State of Alabama (2006); United States v. State of 
Georgia (2004); United States v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (2004); United States v. Oklahoma (2002); United States. v. Texas (2002).
67 United States v. State of Michigan (2000); United States v. New York City Board of Elections (1998); United States v. State of Oklahoma (1998); United 
States v. State of Mississippi (1996); United States v. Orr (1995); United States v. State of New Jersey (1994); United States v. State of Michigan (1993).
